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INNOVATION WARFARE 
Jeanne Suchodolski, Suzanne Harrison, & Bowman Heiden* 
Innovation, in particular, technology-based innovation, is the 
key driver for both economic competitiveness and national security. 
Other nations, with interests adverse to the United States, recognize 
this fact. In an increasingly interconnected world, nation states seek 
to accumulate innovation prowess, and hence economic strength as 
a key element of their geopolitical power. Improving the living 
conditions of one’s citizens is a justifiable and laudable goal. 
However, especially savvy nation states, such as China, also pursue 
such ends as a mechanism to influence or diminish the national 
security and geopolitical power of the United States. These actions 
also threaten the post-WWII liberal economic order and worldwide 
peace and security. There is no need to inflict upon the world the 
carnage of war if geopolitical aims can be achieved via alternative 
competitive means. 
This particular form of competitive strategy pursued by adversarial 
nation states and the targeting of America’s innovation ecosystem can 
be labeled: “Innovation Warfare.” Innovation Warfare is further 
defined as an executable doctrine with specific strategic goals and 
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elements. The articulation of this doctrine is believed to be new and 
novel. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Innovation, in particular, technology-based innovation, is the 
key driver for both economic competitiveness and national security. 
Other nations, with interests adverse to the United States, recognize 
this fact. In an increasingly interconnected world, nation states seek 
to accumulate innovation prowess, and hence economic strength, as 
a key element of their geopolitical power. Especially savvy nation 
states also pursue such ends as a mechanism to influence or diminish 
the national security and geopolitical power of the United States. 
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There is no need to inflict upon the world the carnage of war if one’s 
geopolitical aims can be achieved via alternative competitive means. 
Several authors suggest China’s long-term ambitions include 
unseating the United States as the world’s economic and political 
leader.1 More compelling than opinions, several United States 
(“U.S.”) government and private studies document a systematic and 
coordinated effort by China to achieve technical and economic 
dominance through misappropriation of U.S. technology.2 These 
efforts are additionally supported by a companion effort to weaken 
international economic institutions and norms designed to protect 
U.S. intellectual property and free trade.3 The Chinese tactics 
include illegal means, and sophisticated use of legal means, to 
                                                 
 1 See, e.g., JONATHAN D.T. WARD, CHINA’S VISION OF VICTORY 104 (2019); 
ROBERT SPALDING & SETH KAUFMAN, STEALTH WAR: HOW CHINA TOOK OVER 
WHILE AMERICA’S ELITE SLEPT 12 (2019); GRAHAM ALLISON, DESTINED FOR 
WAR: CAN AMERICA AND CHINA ESCAPE THUCYDIDES’S TRAP? 107–32, 152 
(2017) [hereinafter ALLISON]; GRAHAM ALLISON ET AL., LEE KUAN YEW: THE 
GRANDMASTER’S INSIGHTS ON CHINA, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE WORLD 16, 
42–43 (2013) [hereinafter ALLISON ET AL.]. 
 2 See, e.g., MICHAEL BROWN & PAVNEET SINGH, DEF. INNOVATION UNIT 
EXPERIMENTAL (DIUX), CHINA’S TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER STRATEGY: HOW 
CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES ENABLE A STRATEGIC 
COMPETITOR TO ACCESS THE CROWN JEWELS OF U.S. INNOVATION 16 (2008), 
https://admin.govexec.com/media/diux_chinatechnologytransferstudy_jan_2018
_(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/U9MG-YW9X]; SEAN O’CONNER, HOW CHINESE 




 3 See JIM MATTIS, SUMMARY OF THE 2018 NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DEP’T OF DEFENSE 1–3 (2018), 
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-
Strategy-Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/P78Y-UY6S]; see also Colum Lynch, 
China Bids to Lead World Agency Protecting Intellectual Property, FOREIGN 
POL’Y (Nov. 26, 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/26/china-bids-lead-
world-intellectual-property-organization-wipo/ [https://perma.cc/8GNZ-WJY3] 
(reporting on China’s attempt to head the World Intellectual Property 
Organization and quoting one intellectual property expert: “[w]hy would you 
want to put the fox in charge of the henhouse?”). 
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misappropriate U.S. technology and weaken the U.S. innovation 
infrastructure including: 
a) Leveraging the open university and laboratory ecosystem via 
direct sponsorship and engagement of Chinese nationals;4 
b) Devaluing U.S. positions in patents and technology 
platforms;5 and 
c) Accessing private sector U.S. technology through 
acquisitions and ownership stakes in existing firms, funding 
of high-tech start-ups, and forced joint ventures and other 
contractual agreements as a prerequisite for entering the 
Chinese market.6 
This particular form of competitive strategy targeting the 
innovation ecosystem in the United States is labeled by the Authors 
as “Innovation Warfare,”7 and it is defined as an executable 
competitive strategy: 
a) Reflecting an innovation, intellectual property, and 
technology strategy articulated and executed by the state 
(e.g. China); 
b) Using illegal means, political means, and legal economic 
activities—of the type previously residing solely in the 
province of commercial enterprise, to achieve the state’s 
objectives; 
c) Employing these economic and innovation activities to 
achieve both economic geopolitical power and to enhance 
military capabilities; and 
                                                 
 4 BROWN & SINGH, supra note 2. 
 5 MATTIS, supra note 3. 
 6 BROWN & SINGH, supra note 2. 
 7 The Authors are aware that the term “warfare” can be read narrowly to mean 
the use of armed force, actions legally justifying the use of armed force, or actions 
taken ancillary to the prosecution of armed conflict. Objections exist to the use of 
the term “warfare” in other peacetime contexts, such as, “cyberwar” or 
“information warfare.” For reasons further developed throughout this paper, the 
Authors nonetheless adopt this term in the context of “Innovation Warfare” to 
articulate the existence of an aggressive competitive strategy currently pursued by 
adversaries to the United States. This does not imply that pursuit of such 
competitive strategies is by itself, legal justification for armed conflict or 
intervention. 
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d) Functioning as a military, national security, and defense 
doctrine not solely as a reflection of the state’s economic 
policy goals nor commercial competition in the ordinary 
course.  
Innovation Warfare does not just threaten American jobs and 
economic prosperity. By simultaneously co-opting and weakening 
the innovation capabilities of the United States, China seeks to 
advance its rise to world power. China’s prosecution of Innovation 
Warfare not only encompasses a rejection of a rules-based 
international order, but also poses an existential threat. A world 
where China dominates the technology landscape is not just about 
who earns the profits or prevails in an abstract geopolitical fight. 
According to the National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America (“National Security Strategy”), China pursues a world in 
which economies are less free, less fair, and less likely to respect 
human dignity and freedoms.8 China’s Innovation Warfare activities 
risk the type of economic and geopolitical aggressions that were a 
root cause of two World Wars.  
America must urgently articulate and execute a defensive 
Innovation Warfare counterstrategy. At its core, Innovation Warfare 
strategies are about seizing control of the technological future(s), 
thereby securing a dominant economic and security position from 
which to accomplish other geopolitical aims. In view of that central 
observation and the necessity for a coherent response, this Article 
proposes a four-step approach to crafting and executing the needed 
Innovation Warfare counterstrategy: 
1) Future-Oriented Technology Intelligence – Develop machine 
learning tools that identify the possible technological future(s) 
and drive towards the preferred future(s); 
2) Strategic Technology Development – Optimize and scope 
federal research and development (“R&D”) spending to seed 
the innovations necessary to attain the preferred future(s); 
                                                 
    8 WHITE HOUSE, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 (2017) [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE], 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-
0905.pdf [https://perma.cc/EDC4-RUCN]. 
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3) Secure Technology Control Positions – Identify and secure 
control positions along the preferred future technology 
implementation path, including deploying and protecting 
intellectual property as an armament in the Innovation 
Warfare battlespace; and 
4) Organize to Win – Develop cross-functional capabilities and 
inter-organizational coordination both within the government 
and across the public-private interface. 
The capability to implement the Innovation Warfare 
counterstrategy already exists within the Department of Defense and 
among key U.S. public and private stakeholders. The missing link is 
a strategic plan and organization that brings together these existing 
capabilities. Such a plan not only neutralizes the Chinese Innovation 
Warfare efforts, but maintains the global technology leadership that 
is critical to U.S. national security and economic competitiveness. 
The Innovation Warfare counterstrategy defined in this Article 
provides this missing link.  
The Article’s three major topics describe in greater detail: 
innovation ecosystem vulnerabilities and doctrinal concepts; why 
existing recommendations, although meritorious, fail to articulate a 
coherent response; and new proposals and legal authorities for 
counterstrategies and government action. These three major topics 
are further subdivided and presented in five sections: a background 
describing the criticality of the innovation ecosystem to U.S. 
prosperity and security; China’s economic ascent and prosecution of 
Innovation Warfare to achieve its geopolitical goals; the need for a 
comprehensive U.S. Innovation Warfare counterstrategy; the 
specific elements of an Innovation Warfare counterstrategy; and 
conclusions. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The United States became the world’s largest economy 
following the Civil War.9 The late nineteenth century saw a burst of 
                                                 
 9 ANGUS MADDISON, THE WORLD ECONOMY: HISTORICAL STATISTICS 259–61 
(2003) (showing the U.S. economy became the world’s largest economy shortly 
after 1870). 
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innovative technologies that became cornerstones of modern life.10 
“Great Inventions” such as the internal-combustion engine, electric 
light, electronic communications, and mechanized transportation 
fueled explosive growth that utterly transformed and elevated the 
standard of living for Americans.11  
Just as important as the invention process was the development 
of the nation’s industrial infrastructure.12 Concurrent developments 
in business organizational design, distribution networks, legal 
frameworks, finance, and manufacturing enabled the delivery of 
these inventions and their attendant benefits to American society as 
new and useful products and services.13 For the purpose of this 
Article, “innovation” is defined as the process of converting 
inventions into useful products and services, including developing 
the infrastructure necessary to do so.14 American proficiency at the 
innovation process resulted in a period of economic expansion from 
1870 to 1970: a period of a magnitude and duration not previously 
witnessed in world history.15 
That the United States maintained such a sustained period of 
economic growth did not occur by happenstance. From the 
beginning, the United States facilitated an egalitarian, rule-based 
legal system designed to enable and de-risk the innovation process 
regardless of social class.16 While the United States’ economic 
                                                 
 10 ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH: THE U.S. 
STANDARD OF LIVING SINCE THE CIVIL WAR 1–2 (2016). 
 11 Id. at 4. 
 12 Christopher Conte & Albert R. Karr, The U.S. Economy: A Brief History, DEP’T 
OF STATE, https://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/oecon/chap3.htm [https://perma.cc/ 3UAA-
VN4X] (last visited Oct. 25. 2020). 
 13 Id. 
 14 This broader concept of innovation is the focus, rather than the narrower 
concept of technology. Whereas technology refers to scientific knowledge, 
innovation encompasses all of society’s means of putting that knowledge into 
motion for society’s benefit. Both the technical knowledge and the infrastructure 
and activities necessary to utilize that knowledge are relevant to economic growth, 
and hence of importance to national security. 
 15 See GORDON, supra note 10, at 1–20. 
 16 See ROBERT D. ATKINSON & STEPHEN J. EZELL, INNOVATION ECONOMICS: 
THE RACE FOR GLOBAL ADVANTAGE 3–6 (2012). 
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history reveals an ongoing struggle to balance laissez-faire, free 
market practices, and proactive government regulation, that same 
history also reveals a government bias towards action in industrial 
innovation policy.17 The United States articulated and executed 
specific initiatives that facilitated this growth at pivotal points 
throughout the duration of this expansion. 
An example of these initiatives includes the Interstate 
Commerce Act regulating the transportation sector and ensuring 
“just and reasonable” access to this critical element of the nation’s 
economic infrastructure.18 Prior to the First World War, the 
government formed the National Advisory Committee for 
Aeronautics (“NACA”) to coordinate research in the emerging field 
of aeronautics and to catch up to technology leaders in Europe.19 
When cooperation amongst aviation industry participants 
subsequently proved difficult, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 
Franklin Roosevelt, employed NACA to broker the formation of the 
Manufacturer’s Aircraft Association and cross-license necessary 
patents.20 During the 1920s, the government employed a similar 
tactic when it influenced the formation of RCA Corporation and 
patent pools to ensure American competitiveness and prevent 
foreign domination of the fledgling radio and electronic 
communication industries.21 
The United States further strengthened its national research 
ecosystem during the 1930s by investing heavily in basic R&D in 
                                                 
 17 See Conte & Karr, supra note 12. 
 18 Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 49-104 §§ 1–2, 24 Stat. 379 
(1887). 
 19 Elizabeth Suckow, National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics Overview, 
NASA (Apr. 23, 2009), https://history.nasa.gov/naca/overview.html [https:// 
perma.cc/EER3-BB39]. 
 20 Alex Roland, SP-4103 Model Research – Volume 1, NASA (1985), 
https://history.nasa.gov/SP-4103/ch2.htm [https://perma.cc/F6WD-NYD9]. 
 21 PETER J. HUGILL, GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS SINCE 1844: GEOPOLITICS AND 
TECHNOLOGY 121 (1999) (describing the U.S. Navy’s efforts to prevent foreign 
domination of American radio communications by ensuring no one company had 
sufficient patent rights to a complete system). 
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anticipation of the coming World War.22 After the war, the 
government leveraged its prior investment in wartime research and 
embarked on a policy of research in scientific investment as a 
cornerstone of the American economy.23 That policy, as outlined in 
1945, continued the national laboratory system, created the National 
Science Foundation, and established a system of federal research 
grants giving rise to the modern university research system.24 That 
university research system, in turn, gave birth to modern clusters of 
innovation such as Silicon Valley, Boston, and Austin.25 
The capabilities inherent in the American innovation ecosystem 
as a consequence of these previous efforts made the promise of 
landing a man on the moon realistic, even if audacious. The 
acquisition of the additional expertise needed to prevail in that race 
was essential for national security.26 America’s space program 
underwrote the development of many technological advances that 
further bolstered the innovation economy.27 
Every source of American economic growth can be derived from 
the role of innovation and technological change.28 The United States 
maintained its position as the world’s largest economy for over 150 
                                                 
 22 See GORDON, supra note 10, at 535–65 (arguing what he calls “The Great 
Leap,” the period from 1920 to 1950 where the Great Depression masks the 
significant investment made in research as well as the rise in wages, fueled a 
second round of innovativeness and a recharge of the American economy). 
23 Vannevar Bush, Science The Endless Frontier, U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFF. (July 
1945), https://www.nsf.gov/od/lpa/nsf50/vbush1945.htm [https://perma.cc/3AYE-
V69Y] (arguing that a continual program of scientific research was essential to the 
United States).  
 24 Id. 
 25 MARGARET O’MARA, CITIES OF KNOWLEDGE: COLD WAR SCIENCE AND THE 
SEARCH FOR THE NEXT SILICON VALLEY 71, 74 (2005). 
 26 Martand Jha, This is How the Space Race Changed the Great Power Rivalry 
Forever, NAT’L INT. (July 27, 2017), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-the-space-
race-changed-the-great-power-rivalry-forever-21690 [https://perma.cc/RMD7-6KV5]. 
 27 Aldo Spadoni, How Technology from the Space Race Changed the World, NOW: 




 28 See GORDON, supra note 10, at 569. 
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years because of these industrial policies and initiatives.29 The 
importance of innovation, and hence of pro-innovation initiatives, 
to the creation and sustainment of America’s economic strength is 
evident from an examination of objective data. 
One measure for evaluating the contribution of innovation to 
economic growth is Total Factor Productivity (“TFP”).30 In general, 
TFP captures the efficiency with which labor and capital 
investments combine to generate economic output.31 Figure 1 
depicts the historical averages over time for productivity growth in 
the U.S., wherein the contribution of labor is shown in white. The 
second component, shown in Figure 1 below, displays “capital 
deepening,” which represents the rising capital investment per 
worker hour. Capital deepening accounts for things such as 
investment in tools and equipment.32 Growth not otherwise 
accounted for by labor and capital must arise from some other 
economic input. This “residual” contribution is TFP, which is a 
proximate measure of the contribution of technology and innovation 
to overall productivity and economic growth.33 As seen in Figure 1, 
                                                 
29 Id. 
 30 Total Factor Productivity, Glossary of Statistical Terms, OECD (Dec. 1, 2005) 
[hereinafter OECD], https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3091 [https:// 
perma.cc/RX24-23BZ]; see also Robert Solow, Technical Change and the 
Aggregate Production Function, 39 REV. OF ECONS. AND STATIS. 312, 312–20 
(1957). Solow won the Nobel Prize for his work defining technological change a key 
economic growth factor in addition to influx of capital or improvements in the quality 
or supply of labor. Press Release, Royal Swedish Acad. of Sci., The Sveriges 
Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Noel 1987: Robert M. 
Solow (Oct. 21, 1987), https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1987/ 
press-release/ [https://perma.cc/PG5L-NH3B]. Subsequent research has criticized the 
metric as overly simplistic, but it remains a good proxy for the contribution of 
innovation and technological change to economic growth. See also ATKINSON & 
EZELL, supra note 16, at 294–95 (2012) (explaining the term’s relation to innovation 
and further identifying the limitations of the approach). 
 31 Roberto Cardarelli & Lusine Lusinyan, U.S. Total Factor Productivity 
Slowdown: Evidence from the U.S. States 3 (Int’l Monetary Fund Working Paper, 
WP/15/116, 2015). 
 32 Id. 
 33 See GORDON, supra note 10, at 15–16. 
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America’s post-World War II expansion stemmed from a significant 
increase in TFP during the years between 1920 and 1970. 
 
Figure 1. Contribution of TFP, Capital Deepening, and Labor to 
Productivity Growth34 
Today, the U.S. remains the world’s largest economy, but that 
position is under siege.35 The U.S. is losing its leadership in the 
highest value-added sectors of economic activity and, with it, those 
jobs necessary to maintain the standard of living to which 
Americans have become accustomed.36 Erosion of America’s 
innovation capacity is one reason for this decline.37 As seen in Figure 
2, after 1970, TFP steadily declined to levels not seen since the First 
World War.38  
  
                                                 
 34 Id. (showing 2014 as the latest year for which consistent data is available). 
 35 See ATKINSON & EZELL, supra note 16, at 32–33. 
 36 See id. 
 37 Id. at 33. 
 38 See GORDON, supra note 10, at 547. 
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Figure 2. Average Percentage Growth in TFP by Decade39 
TFP is an imprecise measurement of innovation activity in the 
economy. Given the importance of innovation to economic 
performance and the coarseness of the TFP measure, modern 
researchers have devised alternatives. Two popular innovation 
indices are the Cornell Global Innovation Index and the Bloomberg 
Innovation Index.40 Each of these indices evaluates the capacity for 
innovation-driven growth based on multiple factors, such as the 
strength of the institutional framework, human capital and research, 
infrastructure, and business and market sophistication.41  
These more sophisticated indices also show that the United 
States no longer leads the world in innovation.42 Both the 2019 and 
                                                 
 39 Id. 
 40 See generally CORNELL UNIVERSITY ET AL., THE GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX  
2019 (2019) [hereinafter CORNELL UNIVERSITY ET AL. 2019], https://www.wipo.int/ 
edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_gii_2019.pdf [https:// perma.cc/2EMS-SNEC]; see also 




 41 CORNELL UNIVERSITY ET AL. 2019, supra note 40, at xviii. 
 42 See id. at xxiv; see also CORNELL UNIVERSITY ET AL., THE GLOBAL INNOVATION 
INDEX 2020 xxii (2020) [hereinafter CORNELL UNIVERSITY ET AL. 2020], 
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the 2020 editions of the Cornell Global Innovation Index place the 
United States third.43 The most recent Bloomberg Innovation Index, 
published in 2019, ranked the United States eighth, rebounding back 
into the top ten from even lower rankings in previous years.44 
Enhanced competitive capabilities of foreign economies is a 
second cause for America’s relative decline.45 That other economies 
become strong and raise the standard of living for their citizens need 
not be a detriment to the United States. Cordell Hull, the Secretary 
of State who led the creation of the post-World War II liberal 
international economic order, recognized the linkage between free 
trade and peace.46 In his memoir, Hull wrote, “I saw that you could 
not separate the idea of commerce from the idea of war and peace 
. . . [and] that wars were often largely caused by economic rivalry 
conducted unfairly.”47 Hull believed that rebuilding the world’s 
economies was key to preventing world wars.48 
The combination of post-World War II trade liberalism and 
technology made it easier for people, ideas, and goods to move about 
the world.49 Slow removal of barriers to trade and investment led to 
significant foreign investment and continued worldwide economic 
growth in the post-war years.50 As shown in Figure 3, the gross 
                                                 
https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/gii-2020-report [https://perma.cc/7BNN-
F3SF]; see also Coy, supra note 40. 
 43 CORNELL UNIVERSITY ET AL. 2019, supra note 40, at xxxiv; CORNELL 
UNIVERSITY ET AL. 2020, supra note 42 at xxii. 
 44 Alexandre Tanzi, U.S. and Canada Make Strides in Bloomberg 2019 Innovation 
Index, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 28, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2019-01-28/u-s-canada-make-strides-in-bloomberg-2019-innovation-index 
[https://perma.cc/VDQ8-796U]. 
 45 See ATKINSON & EZELL, supra note 16, at 32. 
 46 Douglas A. Irwin, Trade Liberalization: Cordell Hull and the Case for 
Optimism 5 (Council on Foreign Rels., Working Paper, 2008), https://cdn.cfr. 
org/sites/default/files/pdf/2008/07/CGS_WorkingPaper_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
63M5-WWT8]. 
 47 CORDELL HULL, THE MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL 84 (1948). 
 48 See Irwin, supra note 46, at 8. 
 49 Geoffrey Jones, Restoring a Global Economy, 1950-1980, HARVARD BUS. 
SCH. (Aug. 22, 2005), https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/restoring-a-global-economy-
19501980 [https://perma.cc/546D-LA8T]. 
 50 Id. 
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domestic product (“GDP”) of the United States and many European 
countries began to rise during this period with China lagging and 
then catching up rapidly.51 
 
Figure 3. Comparison of GDP for Various Nations ($ Current PPP)52 
Rising levels of wealth enabled economies to make greater 
investments in R&D over time. These investments put competitive 
pressure on the American innovation economy as other nations 
introduced new and useful products and services. As shown in 
Figure 4, the American share of total world spending on R&D 
activities has significantly declined from nearly seventy percent in 
1960 to only twenty-eight percent in recent years.53 China now 
spends nearly as much on R&D as does the United States.54 The 
pace at which global R&D spending has increased reflects the 
                                                 
 51 See OECD, supra note 30. 
 52 Id. 
 53 COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, 2018 CLARION CALL: LAUNCH OF THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVENESS FRONTIERS 5 
(2018), https://www.compete.org/storage/reports/2018%20clarion%20call%20final. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/T4U9-VQNK]. 
 54 Id. 
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knowledge and innovation intensiveness of the escalating economic 
competition among nations.55 
 
 Figure 4. Proportion of U.S. vs. Worldwide R&D Spending56 
Economic competition from other nations, if appropriately 
structured, can be a race in which all humanity wins.57 Losing its 
position as the world’s largest economy might not impact most 
Americans if their standard of living and institutional integrity 
remain intact.58 While the government should always be concerned 
with strengthening American innovative capacity as a driver of 
economic prosperity, maintaining an economic leadership position 
has not always been coincident with worldwide political leadership. 
In the period spanning from 1870 to just prior to World War II, 
America’s isolationist sentiments left it content to cede world 
political leadership to Great Britain.59 
America’s economic might enabled it to craft a late twentieth 
century liberal world order consistent with American values and 
ideals, fund a technological arms race with the Soviet Union, and 
                                                 
 55 Id. at 6.  
 56 Id. at 5. 
 57 See ATKINSON & EZELL, supra note 16, at 15. 
 58 Charles Kenny, America is No. 2! And that’s Great News., WASH. POST: OPS. 
(Jan. 17, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/america-is-no-2-and-thats-
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prevail in the Cold War.60 The strength of the American economy 
enables continued funding of a military unmatched in its capabilities 
and ability to project power overseas.61 The United States now sits 
as the global leader in a unipolar world as a consequence of this 
economic might.62 
Innovation is the critical linchpin and driver of both military 
technical superiority and economic competitiveness, as shown in 
Figure 5. Deterioration of the American innovation ecosystem 
adversely impacts both national security and the economy. 
 
Figure 5. Innovation as a Driver of National Security 
and Economic Competitiveness 
Deterioration of the American innovation ecosystem also 
adversely impacts the nation’s ability to exercise international 
leadership. Congress, through legislation, has explicitly recognized 
this fact.63 The nation’s innovation base presents a target for modern 
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adversaries to manipulate in order to erode the nation’s military or 
economic power. Softness in innovation capabilities poses a potential 
weakness that adversaries can exploit for their own geopolitical aims. 
Unlike America’s past economic rivalry with Great Britain,64 
adversaries’ goals and means of achieving them threaten American 
culture, values, and national defense. The rise of foreign challengers 
(specifically China), the associated national security consequences, 
and the formulation of defensive counterstrategies form the 
substance of this Article.  
III. CHINESE ECONOMIC ASCENDENCY AND GEOPOLITICAL 
GOALS 
China’s growing economic influence, trade policies, and tactics 
have significant implications for the U.S.65 The actual size of the 
Chinese economy is the subject of debate amongst experts.66 While 
Figure 3 shows that Chinese GDP, on a Purchasing Power Parity 
(“PPP”) basis, exceeds American GDP, PPP measures overestimate 
China’s economic power since prices for goods are significantly 
lower there.67 Measured in U.S. dollars, China’s GDP in 2018 was 
65.3% of United States’ GDP.68  
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Prior to 1978, China practiced a Soviet-style communist 
economic system.69 China launched a series of economic reforms 
that encouraged the formation of new businesses and foreign 
investments following the death of Chairman Mao.70 From 1979, 
when reform began, until 2017, China’s real GDP grew at an 
average annual rate of ten percent.71 This growth constituted the 
fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in history.72 The 
increased purchasing power of Chinese consumers, and the sheer 
size of the Chinese market, led to an increase in bilateral commercial 
ties with the U.S.73 China is currently America’s largest merchandise 
trading partner, its largest source of imports, and its third-largest 
export market.74 
The emergence of China as an economic power concerns U.S. 
policy and lawmakers, who believe China engages in unfair trade 
practices.75 Many policymakers contend China engages in 
mercantilist practices such as undervaluing its currency and 
subsidizing domestic producers.76 China’s industrial policies also 
face criticism for erecting barriers to the participation of foreign 
firms and for undermining their competitiveness by failing to 
enforce and protect intellectual property rights.77 
Each of these behaviors might be seen as unwelcome, but not 
uncommon, mercantilist activities. India, Brazil, Argentina, 
Thailand, Vietnam, and Russia were all recently ranked 
“Moderate-High” on a 2019 index of nations’ mercantilist practices.78 
China, however, was noteworthy for being the only country ranked 
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in the uppermost, “High” category.79 China handily outdistanced 
other nations to unambiguously claim the title of the “world’s most 
innovation-mercantilist nation.”80 
The Chinese government views a growing economy as vital to 
lifting its citizens out of poverty and maintaining social stability.81 
One widely held view in trade policy circles is that China’s rapid 
economic growth will integrate China into the world economy and 
bring mostly positive ancillary benefits to developed economies, 
such as the U.S.82 Any deleterious impacts from China’s economic 
rise and mercantilist trade practices were thought to be a temporary 
burden borne by a modest number of workers in limited market 
segments.83 
A recent survey of economic research reveals such beliefs 
underestimated the job loss in developed economies.84 Chinese 
mercantilist practices have caused harm that is more severe than 
previously forecasted.85 Even more troubling, this recent research 
documents numerous studies showing that China’s trade expansion 
practices negatively impact innovation in most developed nations—
particularly in North America and Europe.86 In particular, one study 
found that firms reduce R&D investment when they belong to 
industries that are exposed to foreign export competition of the type 
exhibited by China.87 Even advanced economies, such as that of the 
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U.S., suffer from a reduction in aggregate innovation if enough of 
these firms exist within their economies.88  
Additional economic literature shows that restrictive trade 
policies and protectionism ultimately suppress innovation and 
adversely impact the long-term economic growth of the 
implementing country.89 Restrictive trade policies increase the cost 
of local production and require local firms to raise prices or reduce 
investment in response.90 Protectionist barriers also foreclose the 
import of potentially superior goods, thereby reducing the welfare 
of the local population who must settle for the consumption of a 
potentially inferior product.91 Furthermore, in nations affected by 
these trade barriers, innovation-producing activities are retarded, 
thereby reducing the number of new products and services available 
both worldwide and in the barrier-erecting economy.92 For this 
additional reason, one policy view is that countries, such as China, 
will abandon or recede from their mercantilist practices as they are 
ultimately self-defeating and harmful.93 
Such beliefs make two potentially false assumptions. First, 
China has not engineered mechanisms to mitigate the negative 
consequences of their mercantilist practices. For example, why 
suffer from the absence of imports of superior products if one can 
simply abscond with the overseas technology and reproduce it at 
home? Second, China’s behavior is ultimately that of a rational 
economic actor on the world stage; the nation’s mercantilist 
motivations and objectives lie purely in the realm of economic 
policy divorced from other geopolitical objectives. The existence of 
non-economic objectives, however, renders China less amenable to 
altering its behavior in response to traditional free market forces, or 
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succumbing to pressure from post-World War II liberal economic 
institutions.   
IV. INNOVATION WARFARE EXPLAINED 
China’s innovation-mercantilist practices must be examined in 
the broader context of China’s stated global political objectives. 
Several authors suggest China’s long-term ambitions include 
unseating the United States as the world’s political leader.94 Chinese 
writings about the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and 
redressing the “Century of Humiliation” are ambiguous enough in 
meaning that they could be read to support such a premise.95 The 
2017 National Security Strategy notes that both China and Russia 
aim to challenge U.S. power and influence and to erode American 
security and prosperity.96  
China electing to pursue such aims via non-military means is 
consistent with its own published national security treatises.97 One 
widely read Chinese treatise laid out a framework for “unrestricted 
warfare,” in which pursuit of national security will no longer depend 
on military might, but will expand to all manner of non-violent 
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conflict having the same or similar destructive potential as war.98 
The treatise states: 
For a long time, both military people and politicians have become 
accustomed to employing a certain mode of thinking, that is, the major 
factor posing a threat to national security is the military power of an 
enemy state or potential enemy state. However, the wars and major 
incidents which have occurred during the last ten years of the 20th 
century have provided to us in calm and composed fashion, proof that 
the opposite is true: military threats are already often no longer the major 
factors affecting national security. Even though they are the same ancient 
territorial disputes, nationality conflicts, religious clashes, and the 
delineation of spheres of power in human history, and are still the several 
major agents of people waging war from opposite directions, these 
traditional factors are increasingly becoming more intertwined with 
grabbing resources, contending for markets, controlling capital, trade 
sanctions, and other economic factors, to the extent that they are even 
becoming secondary to these factors.99 
These same authors go on to say the “use of national defense as 
the main target of national security for a nation actually seems a bit 
outmoded, and at the least is quite insufficient.”100 There is no need 
to inflict upon the world the carnage of war if one’s geopolitical 
aims can be achieved via other competitive means. “The Chinese 
have figured out that if they just stay with ‘peaceful rise’ and just 
contest for first position economically and technologically, they 
cannot lose.”101 
The theoretical concept of synchronizing and marshalling all 
aspects of national power, short of conventional armed hostilities, is 
not new. George Kennan, the principal architect of the U.S. strategy 
in the Cold War, christened such practices as “political warfare.”102 
These competitive grand strategies manifest as a gray zone of 
conflict, blurring conventional black and white definitions of war 
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and peace.103 They nonetheless represent chronic and potentially 
dangerous tensions with significant stakes. The United States now 
recognizes that it exists in a great power competition with China.104 
China is challenging the liberal world order led by the United States, 
and also challenging, if not outright rejecting, the values of human 
dignity and freedom enshrined in this world order.105 
The Chinese government’s grand political warfare strategy is an 
economic one.106 China is a recognized master at using economic 
instruments to achieve geopolitical goals.107 According to the 
Congressional Research Service, China uses its wealth to advance 
its security interests in the Pacific, formalize integration with the 
economies of other nations, and exert increasing influence on 
international institutions such as the United Nations, International 
Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.108 China’s official government 
development plan for the years 2020 to 2049 aims to transform 
China into the world leader in innovation.109 Building and enlarging 
its economy through innovation continues to be at the heart of the 
Chinese strategy, since technology and innovation are drivers of 
both economic growth and national security.110 
Within China’s grand political economic strategy is evidence of 
not only mercantilist trade protection practices, but also of a 
sophisticated sub-strategy specifically targeting American 
technology and innovation. The Defense Innovation Unit 
Experimental (“DIUX”) and the U.S.-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission each conducted a review of Chinese 
technology transfer activities aimed at acquiring American 
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expertise.111 The White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing 
Policy published an additional report on the topic in 2018.112 All 
three reports had similar findings.113 As the DIUX team noted, the 
emerging composite picture “illustrates the intent, design, and 
dedication of a regime focused on technology transfer at a massive 
scale.”114 
Technology acquisition efforts occur with equal vigor at home 
and abroad. American firms doing business with a Chinese firm do 
not engage in free market activities with a commercial counterpart. 
The Chinese economy is state-led.115 The Communist Party retains 
control over most Chinese industries and companies, including 
those at the top of the Fortune Global 500.116 Leaders of Chinese 
firms must be members of the Communist Party.117 The industrial 
espionage and technology transfer activities waged by China and 
Chinese corporations effectively conscript American business into 
service as the research and development arm of the Chinese state.118 
Figure 6 diagrams the vehicles for Chinese technology transfer 
from the United States as originally identified by the three reports. 
The figure contains some modifications from an original figure 
drawn in the DIUX report. The changes reflect additional, 
subsequently identified, vectors for transfer as further described 
below. While the DIUX report identified a highly aggressive and 
illegal cyber espionage campaign disproportionately larger than that 
of other countries, many of the technology transfer activities 
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leverage mechanisms not barred by law.119 Principle among these are 
foreign direct investment, venture capital investment, talent 
acquisition, licensing (coerced and voluntary), and open-source data 
mining.120  
 
Figure 6. Chinese tactics for appropriating U.S. technology and 
intellectual property121 
The Authors’ research identified additional vectors utilized by 
the Chinese to transfer technology from the United States to China. 
These additional vectors are drawn as ovals in Figure 6. Because 
these new observations are not previously discussed elsewhere, the 
observations are described in greater detail below. 
Chief among these newly emerging vectors of technology 
acquisition is an increasing lack of data security for American firms 
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doing business in China.122 A recent report on U.S. Department of 
Defense supply chain security tallied seven Chinese laws that 
compel disclosure of firms’ technical information to the Chinese 
government or corporate partners.123 An additional Chinese 
regulation in late 2019 forbade the use of secure internet networks, 
or virtual private networks (“VPNs”), commonly used by U.S. firms 
working in China to maintain the privacy and security of their 
information.124 Not only are such networks banned, but the Chinese 
government concurrently announced that all internet traffic within 
the country would be monitored and mined using big data 
analytics.125 A newly created national official shall oversee the data 
harvesting and analytics operation.126 Whether the recent Phase I 
trade agreement has any impact on these practices and on the new 
regulation is unclear. 
The Chinese also actively participate in U.S. consensus 
standards setting activities.127 These mostly western-based 
organizations establish common technical interfaces between 
devices and common operating architectures.128 Without such 
standards, computers would not be able to physically connect to 
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monitors or logically transfer information to them for display. 
Consensus standards involve the participation of interested 
technology companies who share some details about their systems 
in hopes of influencing the resulting standards definition. Firms 
lucky enough to get their technology adopted as a standard might 
dominate the technological evolution of that interface and the 
resulting profits for years to come. The Chinese firm Huawei has the 
largest 5G patent portfolio, with the Chinese firm ZTE ranking fifth 
according to one recent report.129 The top-ranked U.S. firm, 
Qualcomm, ranked seventh.130  
In addition, China has promoted copying of American 
innovations by systemically devaluing the intellectual property 
rights of western entities. China recently bid to lead the World 
Intellectual Property Organization, a move widely regarded as 
placing the breadth and scope of the world’s intellectual property 
portfolios at risk.131 The country’s penchant for filing immense 
numbers of patent applications may serve primarily as a basis to 
invalidate others’ rights rather than a sincere desire to acquire such 
rights for themselves.132 China has also devalued western intellectual 
                                                 
 129 IPLYTICS, supra note 127. Note that these statistics are based on self-
declarations, not confirmed standard essential patents. 
 130 Id. (reporting that U.S. participation in 5G standard setting bodies is lower 
than that of competing firms with Qualcomm’s level of attendance ranking fourth 
amongst all participants). Huawei had the largest attendance at standard setting 
meetings. Id. These numbers demonstrate that Chinese firms grasp the strategic 
importance of standard setting activities and also recognize that participation in 
those forums provides the legal means to both access and influence developing 
technologies. Id. Note that 5G standard essential patents (“SEP”) declarations are 
self-reported, so actual SEP portfolios could differ greatly. 
 131 Lynch, supra note 3. 
 132 Under U.S. and other international patent laws, the prior publication of an 
invention in another country may serve to bar an inventor from obtaining patent 
protection on the same or similar invention in their own, home country. See, e.g., 
35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103. Defensive publication, the preemptive publishing of 
knowledge as a means to prevent a competitor from obtaining patent rights, is a 
well-known business tactic. See, e.g., Sara Boettiger & Cecilia Chi-Ham, 
Defensive Publishing and the Public Domain, in IPHANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES 
879, 883 (2018), http://www.iphandbook.org/handbook/chPDFs/ch10/ipHandbook-
Ch%2010%2001%20Boettiger-Chi-Ham%20Defensive%20Publishing.pdf [https:// 
 
202 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 22: 2 
property rights through restrictive laws on licensing. In particular, 
China limits the time a foreign rights holder has exclusive control 
over patented technology in domestic license agreements.133 After 
expiration of the license, domestic firms are entitled to use licensed 
technology regardless of any residual intellectual property rights 
held by the licensor.134 These activities do not constitute a direct 
technology transfer, but they do promote copying of American 
technology by neutering the legal protections surrounding it. 
The White House labels the collection of China’s technology 
transfer activities as “aggression.”135 Specifically, the White House 
notes that much of China’s economic growth has been achieved 
through “aggressive” acts, policies, and practices that fall outside of 
global norms and rules (collectively, “economic aggression”).136 
These technology transfer behaviors can be seen as a competitive 
strategy supporting China’s grand political strategy, and not merely 
a form of market competition. 
The sum of the aforementioned activities constitutes a particular 
form of competitive strategy targeting America’s innovation 
ecosystem. This newly articulated doctrine, “Innovation Warfare,” 
is defined as follows. 
An executable competitive strategy: 
a) Reflecting an innovation, intellectual property, and 
technology strategy articulated and executed by the state 
(e.g. China); 
b) Using illegal means, political means, and legal economic 
activities—of the type previously residing solely in the 
province of commercial enterprise, to achieve the state’s 
objectives; 
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c) Employing these economic and innovation activities to 
achieve both economic geopolitical power and to enhance 
military capabilities; and 
d) Functioning as a military, national security, and defense 
doctrine not solely a reflection of the state’s economic policy 
goals nor commercial competition in the ordinary course. 
Innovation Warfare does not only threaten American jobs and 
economic prosperity. By simultaneously co-opting and weakening 
the innovation capabilities of the United States, China seeks to 
advance its rise to world power.137 Over the course of history, there 
have been sixteen such times when one rising power sought to 
overtake an existing world power.138 All but four of those historical 
events provoked armed conflict.139 China’s Innovation Warfare 
activities risk the type of economic and geopolitical aggression that 
were a root cause of two World Wars.140  
China challenges and outright rejects the rules-based 
international economic order designed to keep the peace.141 China’s 
leadership sees these rules as “American” and made when the 
Chinese were not present at the table. China now seeks to rewrite 
these rules according to its desires.142 China’s rejection of rules-
based economic principles, as embodied in the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”), intellectual property treaties, and other 
agreements, is destabilizing.  
China’s prosecution of Innovation Warfare and its rejection of a 
rules-based order also poses an existential threat. A world where 
China dominates the technology landscape is not just about who 
earns the profits or prevails in an abstract geopolitical fight. China 
pursues a world in which economies are less free, less fair, and less 
likely to respect human dignity and freedoms, according to the 
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National Security Strategy.143 Chinese culture differs from American 
culture in profound ways.144 Chinese internet and data mining 
products are not likely to embody American values of privacy and 
freedom of expression.145 China already uses facial recognition 
technology, data mining, and other twenty-first century innovations 
to track and score its citizens’ behaviors.146 The Chinese government 
uses these measures to conform citizens’ behaviors to a 
government-determined standard and to deny citizens who fail to 
conform freedoms and benefits.147 Chinese companies were recently 
accused of inappropriately using backdoors built into 
telecommunications equipment to monitor the lives of people, 
                                                 
 143 See THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 8. 
 144 SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING 
OF WORLD ORDER 25, 223–25 (2003). 
 145 Shaun Waterman, Gary Shapiro Calls 5G ‘Battleground’ Between US and 
China, VIA SATELLITE (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.satellitetoday.com/ 
innovation/2019/11/05/gary-shapiro-calls-5g-battleground-between-us-and-
china/undefined [https://perma.cc/J6EA-MCRE]; SPALDING & KAUFMAN, supra 
note 1, at xii-xiv. 
 146 Charlie Campbell, How China Is Using “Social Credit Scores” to Reward and 
Punish Its Citizens, TIME (2019), https://time.com/collection/davos-2019/5502592/ 
china-social-credit-score/ [https://perma.cc/5Y5G-VF3N] (documenting a variety of 
tracking technologies, including facial recognition, and systems designed to create 
a complex reward and punishment system for Chinese citizens). While these 
efforts can be seen as a reflection of a culture wishing to stamp out disorder and 
fraud, as Campbell observes “they are undeniably intrusive.” Id.  
 147 See Louise Matsakis, How the West Got China’s Social Credit System 
Wrong, WIRED (July 29, 2019, 3:35 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/china-
social-credit-score-system/ [https://perma.cc/X7LU-GT5X] (arguing that initial 
reporting about the system was based on secondhand information and was 
intended “as a cautionary tale for” western uses of similar technologies). This 
updated reporting based on original language and better source reporting does, 
however, document a complicated interwoven system that can deny travel and 
other benefits. Id. As many as 13 million people are on the Supreme People’s 
Court blacklist. Id. For a view of how Chinese citizens view the social credit 
system in the context of Chinese culture, see Xinyuan Wang, Hundreds of Chinese 
Citizens Told Me What They Thought About the Controversial Social Credit 




DEC. 2020] Innovation Warfare 205 
regardless of citizenship or location.148 As the President and CEO of 
the Consumer Technology Association said in relation to the battle 
over telecommunications technology, “[o]ur children’s standard of 
living, their way of life, will depend on how well we do . . . . [I]f we 
lose, we lose potentially, those other battles about who we are as a 
nation and our focus on individual liberty.”149 For at least each of 
these reasons, Innovation Warfare presents America with a threat 
against which it must defend itself. 
V. THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE U.S. INNOVATION 
WARFARE COUNTERSTRATEGY 
In recognition of the Innovation Warfare threat, defending the 
nation’s innovation base against competitors became an element of 
the country’s National Security Strategy in 2017.150 A number of 
contemporary whitepapers and reports subsequently laid out 
thoughtful recommendations on how best to proceed.151 Each of 
these reports, summarized below, concludes that the United States 
lacks a comprehensive counter-competitive strategy.152 However, 
                                                 
 148 See Bojan Pancevski, U.S. Officials Say Huawei Can Covertly Access Telecom 
Networks, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 12, 2020, 8:41 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-
officials-say-huawei-can-covertly-access-telecom-networks-11581452256 
[https://perma.cc/7D2H-H273] (describing Huawei’s use of telecommunications 
backdoors to illicitly access private telecommunications traffic). The backdoors 
were put in place post-9/11 for use by law enforcement to conduct surveillance 
under warrant. Huawei denies the allegations. The U.S. claims to have proof. Id. 
 149 Waterman, supra note 145 (speaking on the importance of 5G cellular 
technologies at DC5G). 
 150 See WHITE HOUSE, supra note 8, at 21. 
 151 See WARD, supra note 1, at 95. 
 152 See BROWN & SINGH, supra note 2, at 4 (“The U.S. government does not 
have a holistic view of how fast this technology transfer is occurring, the level of 
Chinese investment in U.S. technology, or what technologies we should be 
protecting.”); see also WARD, supra note 1, at xii (citing Admiral Scott Swift, 
U.S. Navy (Retired), on “the necessity of the United States to develop a grand 
strategy of its own”); JAMES MANYIK ET AL., COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., 
INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE REPORT NO. 77, INNOVATION AND NATIONAL 
SECURITY: KEEPING OUR EDGE 3 (2019), https://www.cfr.org/report/keeping-our-
edge/pdf/TFR_Innovation_Strategy.pdf [https://perma.cc/6X4G-YXSW] (noting that 
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the aggregation of the many meritorious suggestions contained 
within these reports still does not yield a coherent grand 
counterstrategy. 
Bradford Lee documented four distinct, but not mutually 
exclusive, categories of competitive strategies or counterstrategies, 
useful here for organizing and assessing the myriad of existing 
proposals for an Innovation Warfare response.153 The categories 
have been rephrased slightly and adapted here for the Authors’ 
purposes. The four counter-competitive strategies, as identified by 
Lee, are summarized as follows: 
1) Denial: These strategies neutralize the impact of the 
competitor’s strategy. Thus, even if the competitor executes 
the elements of their strategy successfully, their desired 
objective will not be achieved. In the context of Innovation 
Warfare, strategies that enhance America’s innovation 
capabilities are an example of a denial strategy. Even if 
China’s Innovation Warfare strategy executes as planned, 
America will simply outrun and outperform it in the 
innovation race. Other denial strategies thwart execution of 
the competitor’s strategy. Review and approval of foreign 
investment by the Department of Treasury to prevent foreign 
ownership of critical American technologies is one example. 
To distinguish these two different forms of Innovation 
Warfare denial strategies, they have been renamed as: 
“Outperform” and “Thwart.” 
2) Cost Imposition: These strategies seek to impose 
consequences or ratchet up the costs for pursuing the 
competitive strategy such that the costs for pursuing the 
strategy negate the benefits. Trade wars and economic 
sanctions are the most common forms of cost imposition. In 
                                                 
“the government and the private sector must undertake a comprehensive and 
urgent response”). 
 153 See TAI MING CHEUNG & THOMAS MAHNKEN, THE GATHERING PACIFIC STORM: 
EMERGING US-CHINA STRATEGIC COMPETITION IN DEFENSE TECHNOLOGICAL AND 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 20–23 (2018). 
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the context of Innovation Warfare, cost imposition strategies 
can include enforcement of intellectual property rights. 
3) Co-opting the Competitor’s Strategy: These strategies either 
leverage elements of the adversary’s own strategy against 
them or induce the adversary to take actions that reduce the 
effectiveness of their strategy. For example, in the context of 
Innovation Warfare, the Chinese penchant for devaluing 
western intellectual property rights by publishing an 
extensive quantity of prior art documents also serves as a 
source of competitive intelligence about Chinese research 
activities. 
4) Political Leverage: These strategies exploit or influence 
factors within an adversary’s political system. Persuading 
the Chinese populace against intellectual property theft may 
prove difficult. In the context of Innovation Warfare, 
however, the political ecosystem is much broader and 
includes other nation states, trading partners, and 
international institutions.154 
Table 1155 summarizes the defensive countermeasures 
recommended by existing studies and whitepapers, organized by the 
type of counterstrategy employed
                                                 
 154 Id. 
155 MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 152; BROWN & SINGH, supra note 2; ATKINSON & 
EZELL, supra note 16; BRAD SMITH & CAROL ANN BROWNE, TOOLS AND WEAPONS: 
THE PROMISE AND THE PERIL OF THE DIGITAL AGE (2019); Letter from Kelvin K. 
Droegemeier, Dir., White House Off. of Sci. and Tech. Pol’y, to the U.S. Rsch. Cmty. 
(Sept. 16, 2019); IP Attache Services, USPTO https://www.uspto.gov/ip-policy/ip-
attache-program/ip-attache-services [https://perma.cc/G55H-SYYX]; BEENY, 
supra note 122; see also DEP’T OF DEF., INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY REPORT: 
PREPAREDNESS, PARTNERSHIP, AND PROMOTING A NETWORKED REGION (2019), 
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-
OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/46ZX-M79F] (incorporating the National Defense Strategy and 
recommending the strengthening of economic partnerships in the region to counter 
Chinese influence); WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CRITICAL AND 
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES (Oct. 2017) [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL 
STRATEGY], https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/ uploads/2020/10/National-
Strategy-for-CET.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HU5-7RG6]. 
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The vast majority of recommended actions documented in Table 
1 seek to outperform Chinese innovation accretion by improving the 
United States’ own domestic innovation infrastructure and 
capabilities. Official White House documents on the topic include A 
Strategy for American Innovation, which has not been itemized in 
Table 1, but falls squarely in this camp and mirrors many of the 
recommendations of Table 1.156 The most recent White House 
document, National Strategy for Critical and Emerging 
Technologies, articulates the goal of maintaining U.S. world 
leadership in critical and emerging technologies.157 Attainment of 
this goal rests on two major pillars, the first of which clearly seeks 
to bolster the U.S. innovation ecosystem to outperform the Chinese 
ecosystem.158 Data in Table 1 reflects key measures called for in the 
National Strategy for Critical and Emerging Technologies. Other than 
the Success Act, which aims to diversify the nation’s pool of 
inventors, specific executable steps with measurable outcomes for 
pursuit initiatives in this category could not be identified.159 
Some of the other categories of recommendations given in Table 
1 have been implemented with varying degrees of success. The 
government appears to be proactively pursuing measures designed 
to directly thwart China’s technology appropriation tactics. Treasury 
Department guidelines for review of foreign investments under the 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”) 
                                                 
 156 See NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL & OFF. OF SCI. & TECH. POL’Y, A STRATEGY FOR 
AMERICAN INNOVATION (2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/ 
files/strategy_for_american_innovation_october_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/JVU8-
WPKP]. 
  157 See generally WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 155. 
  158 Id. at 2, 7. 
 159 See Study of Underrepresented Classes Chasing Engineering and Science 
Success Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-273, 132 Stat. 4158 (recognizing that 
“patents and intellectual property are important engines of innovation, invention, 
and economic growth,” and that “there is a significant gap in the number of patents 
applied for and obtained by women and minorities.”). The Act also directed the 
United States Patent Office and others to work to close this gap. 
 
210 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 22: 2 
regulations were tightened in 2018.160 These revised guidelines 
brought increased scrutiny of Chinese investments in critical and 
emerging technologies.161 As a result, Chinese investment in U.S. 
firms fell eighty-three percent in 2018, from $29 billion to $5 billion 
in 2017, and from a previous high of $46 billion in 2016.162 
The White House issued an open letter to the nation’s research 
institutions in 2019.163 This letter began a dialogue regarding 
Chinese efforts to acquire U.S. taxpayer-funded research via a 
variety of mechanisms, including direct sponsorship of U.S. faculty, 
placement of Chinese nationals at U.S. research institutions, student 
exchanges, and outright theft of research.164 While the letter 
contained no specific directives, this initial dialogue undoubtedly 
raised institutional awareness of the matter. Subsequent to issuance 
of the letter, several institutions took action against researchers who 
failed to disclose their relationships with Chinese institutions.165 The 
                                                 
 160 See Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, Pub. L. 
No. 115-232, §§ 1701–28, 132 Stat. 2174, 540 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 4656) 
(adding four new categories of review to the previous regulations: (i) purchase or 
lease of land proximate government facilities; (ii) investments that may provide 
access to certain nonpublic technical information of U.S. businesses; (iii) changes 
in foreign investor’s rights resulting in control of a U.S. business; and (iv) any 
other transaction designed to circumvent CFIUS jurisdiction). 
 161 See id. 
 162 Paul Wisman, China’s Investment in US Drops 83% Amid Growing 
Mistrust, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 8, 2019), https://apnews.com/ 
d3009cef73e24479ac53e8ad968effcd [https://perma.cc/DB5W-ECRY]. 
 163 See Droegemeier, supra note 155. 
 164 Id. 
 165 See, e.g., Tara Law, Emory University Fires 2 Neuroscientists Accused of 
Hiding Chinese Ties, TIME (May 25, 2019, 3:44 PM), https://time.com/5596066/ 
emory-fires-chinese-researchers/ [https://perma.cc/69UQ-3SXR]; Mike Zaveri, 
Wary of Chinese Espionage, Houston Cancers Center Chose to Fire 3 Scientists, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/22/health/md-
anderson-chinese-scientists.html [https://perma.cc/2A4X-LQXV]; Jeffrey 
Mervis, NIH probe of foreign ties has led to undisclosed firings – and refunds 
from institutions, SCI. (June 26, 2019, 5:10 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/ 
news/2019/06/nih-probe-foreign-ties-has-led-undisclosed-firings-and-refunds-
institutions [https://perma.cc/3KE6-A6EL]; Press Release, Dep’t. of Just., 
Harvard University Professor and Two Chinese Nationals Charged in Three 
Separate China Related Cases (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 
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National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 also 
included several provisions designed to protect U.S. researchers 
from foreign influence and directed the Director of the Office of 
Science and Technology Policy to establish an interagency working 
group to further protect federally funded research from foreign 
interference.166 
Of the remaining recommendations documented in Table 1, on 
which significant actions have been taken, the most notable is the 
current “trade war” resulting from the President’s imposition of 
tariffs for national security reasons under Sections 232 and 301 of 
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.167 These tariffs were met with the 
imposition by China of tariffs on U.S. imports.168 As of this writing, 
the U.S. Trade Representative has concluded “Phase I” of 
negotiations with China to cease the exchange of punitive tariffs.169 
                                                 
harvard-university-professor-and-two-chinese-nationals-charged-three-separate-
china-related [https://perma.cc/N8EF-7X3X]. 
 166 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L No. 116-
92 §§ 228, 1746, 116 Stat. 1790-646 (2019), https://www.congress.gov/116/ 
bills/s1790/BILLS-116s1790enr.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WKW-SMXQ] (directing the 
Secretary of Defense in Section 228 to carry out research on foreign malign influence 
operations in university research programs). Section 1746 of the Act states:  
The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, acting 
through the National Science and Technology Council, in consultation 
with the National Security Advisor, shall establish or designate an 
interagency working group to coordinate activities to protect federally 
funded research and development from foreign interference, cyber-
attacks, theft, or espionage and to develop common definitions and best 
practices for Federal science agencies and grantees, while accounting for 
the importance of the open exchange of ideas and international talent 
required for scientific progress and American leadership in science and 
technology. 
Id. § 1746. 
 167 WAYNE MORRISON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33536, CHINA-U.S. TRADE 
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These negotiations struck an accord on agricultural trade and certain 
intellectual property matters, but left unresolved many of the 
necessary negotiations on key intellectual property and innovation 
issues at the root of China’s Innovation Warfare strategy until 
“Phase II.”170 Specifically, the agreement does not appear to address 
the theft of intellectual property by Chinese companies.171 
The National Strategy for Critical and Emerging Technologies 
also contains a smattering of additional political strategy 
measures.172 Specifically, the document calls for increased 
communication with the private sector to raise public awareness and 
to enlist the cooperation and assistance of industry in guarding 
against innovation ecosystem vulnerabilities.173 The document 
additionally lists initiatives that foster the incorporation of 
democratic norms and ideals into the innovation process via private 
sector and international alliances.174 While a limited subset of the 
enumerated initiatives is described with specificity, most are simply 
aspirational.175 
Not listed in Table 1 are the myriad of legislative initiatives, 
currently pending in Congress, intended to repulse the Innovation 
Warfare threat posed by China. The Authors’ research reveals at 
least twenty such bills introduced by members of both parties, but 
as of yet, none have been taken up for vote or transmitted to the other 
chamber.176 The majority of this pending legislation concerns the 
imposition of sanctions or penalties for intellectual property theft, or 
otherwise proposes restrictions on trade with certain entities.177 
                                                 
 170 Rachel Layne, Here’s What’s in the U.S.-China “Phase One” Trade Deal, 
CBS NEWS (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-china-trade-deal-
heres-whats-in-the-us-china-phase-one-trade-deal/ [https://perma.cc/9K5F-9JR7]. 
 171 Id. (citing U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer). 
 172 See WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 155. 
 173 Id. at 10. 
 174 Id. at 7. 
 175 See id. 
 176 This research included a search of www.congress.gov for pending 
legislation and its status as of January 2020. 
 177 See, e.g., Preventing SBA Assistance from Going to China Act of 2019, 
S.75, 116th Cong. (2019); Telecommunications Denial Order Enforcement Act, 
S. 152, 116th Cong. (2019); Sanction Entities in China for Undermining Rules, 
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Congress recently heard testimony from the Department of Defense 
on its efforts to combat the threat from China, but, as of yet, no clear 
mandates for executable actions have emerged.178 
Despite an attempt to organize existing recommendations and 
initiatives using the format suggested by Lee, current 
recommendations and pending legislative actions consist mostly of 
a list of meritorious, but loosely related tactics when viewed in 
totality. Prior white papers and reports nonetheless contain many 
constructive and worthwhile ideas that should be implemented. The 
National Strategy for Critical and Emerging Technologies is 
commendable for recognizing the need for a unified government 
approach.179 This official policy document also does much to 
advance the formulation of a national Innovation Warfare 
counterstrategy by defining those critical technologies in which it is 
necessary to lead and those for which risks must simply be 
mitigated.180 Yet, a significant number of the actions called for in 
support of those objectives lack particulars and remain ambiguous 
in scope and execution.181 The viability of this strategy document 
past the current national election cycle is also uncertain. Thus, 
existing recommendations and initiatives, even when taken together, 
fail to define a comprehensive counterstrategy for three principal 
reasons: 
1) Existing recommendations focus largely on boosting the 
nation’s innovation capacity but infrequently establish 
broader objectives, measurable outcomes, or endpoints. This 
omission makes assessing strategic effectiveness difficult 
both because the desired end state is uncertain as well as 
because there are no feedback loops to assess progress 
against goals and make mid-course corrections. 
                                                 
Exploiting Intellectual Property Act of 2019, S.1092, 116th Cong. (2019); Zero 
Tolerance for Electronics Theft Act, H.R. 2841, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 178 See generally DOD’s Role in Competing with China, Hearing before the Armed 
Servs. Comm., 116th Cong. (Jan. 15, 2020), https://armedservices.house.gov/2020/1/ 
full-committee-hearing [https://perma.cc/L7T8-DCMD] (noting the Committee took 
testimony from three witnesses each of whom identified possible DoD roles). 
 179 See WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 155, at 1–2. 
 180 Id. at 3–4. 
 181 See id.  
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2) Existing reports and recommendations rest principally on 
refortifying the strength of the American innovation 
ecosystem and fail to recognize the value of choke points or 
control positions in securing needed innovation resources 
and in making progress along future innovation roadmaps. 
In particular, existing efforts underappreciate intellectual 
property as one form of control position, and underutilize 
intellectual property as an armament in the Innovation 
Warfare battlespace. 
3) No allocation of roles and responsibilities exists. While 
some authors and official documents have called for a 
“whole of government approach,” there is no discernable 
lead to coordinate the effort, no visible assignment of 
tasking, no sharing of information and resources, and no 
specified organizational design for executing upon the 
strategy.182 
VI. CRAFTING AN INNOVATION WARFARE COUNTERSTRATEGY 
The United States must urgently articulate and execute a 
defensive Innovation Warfare counterstrategy in view of the above 
findings. While the United States cannot be sure of the metes and 
bounds of the Chinese Innovation Warfare efforts, construction of 
the U.S. counterstrategy should be guided by certain core principles. 
First, the United States acts as a nation that respects personal 
liberties and the rights of its people. Formulation and execution of 
an Innovation Warfare defense strategy do not equate to nationalism 
or xenophobic behaviors. Assessing the risk presented by individual 
foreign nationals is a totality of the circumstances evaluation that 
balances a free and open society against potential harms. In twenty-
first century world where big data and analytics provide intelligence 
and competitive advantages to those in possession of it, the United 
States must establish and adhere to norms on its use while respecting 
individual freedoms and rights to privacy. 
                                                 
 182 See BROWN & SINGH, supra note 2, at 3, 25; see also WARD, supra note 1, 
at xiv. 
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Second, the post-World War II economic order led to an 
international rules-based system of laws that are invaluable for 
avoiding armed conflict. Some may fairly criticize this liberal 
economic order as imperfect. However, an international system of 
rules-based trade is a means of peace. The Innovation Warfare 
competitive strategies run by China seek to undermine confidence 
in and alter the rules-based systems surrounding trade, innovation, 
and intellectual property. 
These Innovation Warfare strategies are destabilizing. Although 
Innovation Warfare competitive strategies run by adversaries may 
have consequences as drastic as war, successful counterstrategies 
must both remain within the rules paradigm and avoid escalation 
ladders to armed conflict.  
Third, Innovation Warfare counterstrategies should remain 
consistent with and support the National Security Strategy and the 
National Defense Strategy of the United States. 
Fundamentally, at its core, Innovation Warfare is about seizing 
control of the technological future(s), thereby securing a dominant 
economic and security position from which to accomplish other 
geopolitical aims. In view of that central observation, the necessity 
for a coherent strategic response, and the principles articulated 
above, a four-step approach to crafting and executing the needed 
Innovation Warfare counterstrategy is proposed: 
1) Future-Oriented Technology Intelligence – Develop machine 
learning tools to identify the possible technological futures 
and drive towards the preferred future(s); 
2) Strategic Technology Development – Optimize and scope 
federal R&D spending to seed the innovations necessary to 
attain the preferred future(s); 
3) Secure Technology Control Positions – Identify and secure 
control positions along the preferred future technology 
implementation path, including deploying and protecting 
intellectual property as an armament in the Innovation 
Warfare battlespace; and 
4) Organize to Win – Develop cross-functional capabilities and 
inter-organizational coordination both within the government 
and across the public-private interface.  
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VII. THE ELEMENTS OF AN INNOVATION WARFARE 
COUNTERSTRATEGY 
Seizing control of the technological future presupposes the 
satisfaction of several preconditions. First, one can identify the set 
of multiple possible future(s) that could possibly arise from the 
present state. Second, there exists some framework for assessing 
which of these alternative future(s) would be preferable over the 
others. Third, one possesses both the mechanisms and the means to 
drive towards and achieve the preferred future state(s). Fourth, one 
can organize to manage the attainment of each of these 
preconditions.  
A. Future-Oriented Technology Intelligence – Identify Possible 
Technological Future(s) and Drive Towards the Preferred 
Technological Future(s) 
One cannot seize control of the technological future(s) if one 
cannot see the evolution of potential future(s). Although the 
National Strategy for Critical and Emerging Technologies itemizes 
critical technologies in which the United States must lead, such lists 
are merely a grainy, low-resolution snapshot of current times.183 The 
entity with the best and earliest intelligence about emerging 
technological trends and evolutions can most effectively optimize 
their innovation investments and gain an early lead in critical 
technology areas. The nation state with the most advanced and 
robust forecasting tool is the one likely to prevail in the Innovation 
Warfare competition. 
Fortunately, this first precondition is no longer the stuff of fairy 
dust or expert opinions. Prior to 2005, little scholarship or 
development of analytic capabilities for technology prediction 
existed.184 Companies wishing to lay out future strategic direction 
                                                 
 183 See WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 155, Annex (identifying a 
list of twenty technology areas); see also Memorandum from Russell T. Vought, Dir., 
Off. of Mgmt. and Budget, to The Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies 1 
(Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/M-20-
29.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WE3-EPKR] (identifying five R&D budgetary positions). 
 184 Katarzyna Halicka, Main Concepts of Technology Analysis in the Light of 
the Literature on the Subject, 182 PROCEDIA ENG’G 291, 292 (2017). 
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and technology roadmaps were the initial developers of, and still 
rely heavily on, these first-generation predictive techniques as a 
source of competitive intelligence.185 These first-generation 
techniques depend almost exclusively on the analysis of patent and 
patent application databases. Two such tools employed during this 
early time period were backward/forward patent citation analysis 
and patent landscape, or contour mapping.186 
Both of these early technology analysis methods remain widely 
used today.187 These early methods, however, really only provide 
snapshots of the status quo from which a patenting entity’s areas of 
technology investment and patenting strength relative to others can 
be inferred. These earlier methods are raised and explained here 
only to distinguish them from the advanced big data analytic 
                                                 
 185 See Brian de Haaff, 8 Key Components of Technology Roadmaps, HUFF 
POST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/8-key-components- of-
techn_b_9413856 [https://perma.cc/7DYP-F7LF]; see also Eric P. Raciti, IP 
Landscaping – Creating a Conceptual Fabric of Information, FINNEGAN (June 
2014), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/articles/ip-landscaping-creating-a-
conceptual-fabric-of-information.html [https://perma.cc/GS5Z-QQEB] (advising 
clients on the strategic advantages of landscaping tools). 
 186 Backward patent citation analysis examines the list of previously issued 
patents referred to by a patent examiner when evaluating whether an invention is 
patentable. Analysis of backward citations reveals concentrations of other 
inventors or companies working in similar technology areas. Forward patent 
citation analysis evaluates the number of times any given patent is cited elsewhere 
by others. An earlier patent cited by many later patents likely documents an 
important invention that served as the foundation for subsequent innovation. See, 
e.g., M.M.S. Karki & Dr. K.S. Krishnan Road, Patent Citation Analysis: A Policy 
Analysis Tool, 19 WORLD PAT. INFO. 269, 271 (1997). Patent landscape analysis, 
provides a visual representation of clusters of patents organized by a common 
theme, such as assignee or subject matter. In the map, the higher the “terrain,” the 
greater the concentration of patenting activity within that technology, the more 
similar the technology to others, the closer together their contours are horizontally 
spaced. See, e.g., WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING PATENT 
LANDSCAPE REPORTS 37–40 (2015), https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/ 
wipo_pub_946.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZSW -AF53]. 
 187 Jeffrey Kuhn, Kenneth Young & Alan Marco, Patent Citations Reexamined, 
51 RAND J. OF ECON. 109, 109–111 (2020) (noting that although just a few patents 
generate the majority of subsequent citations, thereby possibly distorting analysis 
and limiting the usefulness of the tool, the tool remains viable); see also Raciti, 
supra note 185. 
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techniques currently under development, which form the focus of 
this discussion. 
Advanced technology forecasting tools belong to a class of 
analytics known as Future-Oriented Technology Analysis 
(“FTA”).188 FTA is an umbrella concept spanning a range of tools 
used to analyze technology future(s) and their impacts.189 FTA 
studies may be normative or exploratory.190 Normative FTA starts 
from a preferred future and attempts to discern which actions would 
result in that future.191 Explorative FTA focuses on forecasting 
several possible future(s) and then conducting additional analyses to 
assess the most probable or preferred future(s).192 FTA concepts by 
themselves are not new, and the military and government have used 
scenario planning, SWOT analysis, the Delphi technique, and other 
first-generation FTA tools for more than fifty years in various 
fashions.193 
What is new is the explosion in quantitative methods for FTA 
analysis enabled by big data and machine learning that make 
existing technology forecasting tools far more robust than the 
citation analysis, patent contour maps, and opinion-based methods 
of the past.194 Recent techniques also differ from contemporary big 
                                                 
 188 TUGRUL DAIM ET AL., ANTICIPATING FUTURE PATHWAYS THROUGH LARGE 
DATA ANALYSIS x–xi (2016). 
 189 Helvio Jeronimo Junior et al., Approaching Future-Oriented Technology 
Analysis Strategies in Knowledge Management Processes, INT’L CONF. ON 










 193 Daiane Ferrira, Carlos Eduardo Barbosa, Jonice Oliveira & Jano Moreira De 
Souza, Analyzing the Collaborative Aspects of Future-Oriented Technology 
Analysis, INT’L CONF. ON COMPUT. SUPPORTED COOP. WORK IN DESIGN (May 
2016); see Delphi Method, RAND CORP., https://www.rand.org/topics/delphi-
method.html [https://perma.cc/JKW6-GBBZ] (explaining the Delphi method, 
developed by the RAND Corporation in the 1950s was originally used to forecast 
the impact of technology on warfare using informed intuitive judgment). 
 194 DAIM ET AL., supra note 188, at ix (noting the advancements in 
computational tools and the expansion of date sources beyond just patents and 
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data tools in their ability to extend the forecast interval for 
technology prediction.195 State of the art FTA can theoretically 
analyze the current and immediate next stage of technology 
evolution while providing insights on successive generations.196 
Whereas earlier generation techniques might reveal one generation 
ahead, machine learning FTA tools can anticipate next generation 
“+n” evolutions in technology, wherein “n” represents the number 
of successive generations.197 
Modern FTA toolsets encompass a variety of different 
methodologies, including technology data mining, technology 
roadmapping, competitive technical intelligence (“CTI”) analysis, 
bibliographic analysis, and webographic analysis that process not 
only patent data, but also scientometric indicators, blogs, 
trademarks, corporate security filings, speeches, and other relevant 
databases.198 Korean authors Changyong Lee et al. describe one 
example of such methods.199 The method employed by Lee et al. 
analyzes patent application filings and uses neural networks to 
                                                 
acknowledging the growing acceptance of these tools for use in future oriented 
analysis). 
 195 Earlier generation patent contour mapping, for example, simply provides a 
current pictorial view of the existing patent landscape as it exists at a single 
moment in the present. See YI ZHANG ET AL., GENERATING COMPETITIVE TECHNICAL 
INTELLIGENCE USING TOPICAL ANALYSIS, PATENT CITATION ANALYSIS AND TERM 
CLUMPING ANALYSIS, ANTICIPATING FUTURE INNOVATION PATHWAYS THROUGH 
LARGE DATA ANALYSIS 156 (“Citation-based analysis has a fundamental limitation 
in that it underestimates the importance of contemporary patents and may not 
work in rapidly evolving industries where technology life cycles (“TFC”) are 
increasingly short and too many new inventions are being patented throughout the 
world.”); FTA by definition is “future oriented” and provides a variety of tools 
useful for identifying multiple possible technology futures. Id. at xi–xvi. 
 196 ZHANG ET. AL., supra note 195, at 164–165 (identifying technology 
trajectories for technology and sub-technology over a generational time horizon 
spanning the years 1991 to 2014). 
 197 The Authors each have knowledge of proprietary techniques on which this 
conclusion is based. 
 198See DAIM ET AL., supra note 188, at ix–xvi. 
 199 See Changyong Lee et al., Early Identification of Emerging Technologies: 
A Machine Learning Approach Using Multiple Patent Indicators, 127 TECH. 
FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 291, 291–92 (2018). 
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identify emerging technologies at a very early stage.200 Their method 
can additionally predict which of these emerging technologies is 
more likely than other similar emerging technologies to materialize 
as dominant over time.201 In additional examples, Park et al. describe 
network analysis and time series models for predicting emerging 
technology.202 
Numerous other quantitative methodologies exist.203 Figure 7 
diagrams one example of an FTA technique based on graphical 
network analysis. Figure 7, while heavily simplified, provides a 
basic explanation of how this method of explorative FTA works. In 
actual practice, the analysis can employ a wide array of databases 
beyond the patent databases shown in Figure 7. Extensive training 
and validation of the machine learning algorithms are necessary to 
produce valid results.  
                                                 
 
200




 202 See Sang-Sung Park, Seung-Joo Lee, & Sunghae Jun, A Network Analysis 
Model for Selecting Sustainable Technology, 7 SUSTAINABILITY 13126, 13126 
(2015) (describing a network analysis model useful for planning R&D and picking 
sustainable long-term technologies as a focus, with an analysis of Ford Motor 
Co.); Jong-Chan Kim, Joon-Hyuck Lee, Gab- Jo Kim, Sang-Sung Park, & Dong-
Sick Jang, Time Series Analysis of Patent Keywords for Forecasting Emerging 
Technology, 3 KIPS TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE & DATA ENG’G 355 (2014), 
https://doi.org/10.3745/KTSDE.2014.3.9.355 [https://perma.cc/9BKS-79YC] 
(describing the use of auto-regressive integrated moving averages (“ARIMA”), 
which is a statistical analysis technique that uses time series data to predict future 
trends and to forecast technology) (S. Kor.). 
 203 For a relatively recent summary of advanced patent analytic methods, see 
Leonidas Aristodemou & Frank Tietze, The State-of-the-Art on Intellectual 
Property Analytics (IPA): A Literature Review of Artificial Intelligence, Machine 
Learning and Deep Learning Methods for Analysing Intellectual Property (IP), 
55 WORLD PAT. INFO. 37, 41 (2018); Jenny Sanchez-Torres & Ian Miles, The Role 
of Future-Oriented Technology Analysis in e-Government: A Systemic Review, 5 
EUR. J. OF FUTURES RSCH. 1, 3 (2017). 
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Figure 7. Simplified Example of a Graphical FTA Method204 
A recent journal article revealed that Asia is leading in the 
application of machine learning to conduct FTA using patent data.205 
Chinese, Taiwanese, and Korean institutions hold the top ten spots 
in total number of research articles published on this topic.206 So, it 
                                                 
 204 See also Park, Lee & Jun, supra note 202 (describing a graphical network 
methodology, as diagrammed in Figure 7, which begins with a data set for a 
specific technology in contrast with Park et al. that begins with a data set from 
within a company portfolio); Gabjo Kim & Jinwee Bae, A Novel Approach to 
Forecast Promising Technology Through Patent Analysis, 117 TECH. 
FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 228, 229 (2017). 
 205 See Aristodemou & Tietze, supra note 203, at 39. 
 206 Id. at 39–40. 
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is no surprise that China already possesses sophisticated FTA 
capabilities.207 The newly passed regulation authorizing ubiquitous 
data mining of internet traffic and the elimination of domestic VPNs 
gives the Chinese a treasure trove of technology and business 
information to mine for this purpose.208 The Chinese National 
Science Library offers several categories of FTA services for 
Chinese policymakers, research institutions, and Chinese 
companies.209 
In contrast, the United States ranks fourth in FTA research, with 
U.S. authors comprising only eight percent of the research 
contributions to the FTA field.210 A short review of publicly 
available information reveals that a significant amount of military 
technology forecasting still relies upon expert opinions, literature 
reviews, and direct intelligence.211 While these methods remain 
valuable, they leave China and those with robust FTA capabilities 
in a better position to chart the innovation future. Only two 
Department of Defense organizations could be identified—the 
Office of Naval Research and the Defense Logistics Agency—with 
FTA tools under development.212 These FTA tools utilize graphical 
                                                 
 207 Xiwen Liu et al., Combining Scientometrics and Patent-Metrics for CTI 
Service in R&D Decision-Making: Practices of Nation Science Library of CAS, 
in ANTICIPATING FUTURE INNOVATION PATHWAYS THROUGH LARGE DATA 
ANALYSIS 321 (Tugrul U. Daim et al. eds., 2016). 
 
208
 See Dickinson, supra note 124. 
 209 See Liu et al., supra note 207, at 323. 
 210 See Aristodemou & Tietze, supra note 203, at 40. 
 211 See, e.g., MICHAEL O’HANLON, FORECASTING CHANGE IN MILITARY 
TECHNOLOGY, 2020-2040 1–2 (2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/ 
uploads/2018/09/FP_20181218_defense_advances_pt2.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
6Y9B-2X4U]. 
 212 See Dallas Rosson, Predicting Part Lifecycles Utilizing Machine Learning 
(2016) (Master’s Thesis, University of Washington) (on file with author), 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315677947_PREDICTING_PART 
LIFECYCLES_UTILIZING_MACHINE_LEARNING [https://perma.cc/29H3-
G9TC]; Dennis Summers, Network Representation and Visualization to Assess 
Obsolescence Issues, DEF. MFG. & MATERIAL SHORTAGES CONF. (2015); MICHAEL 
S. NASH ET AL., INST. FOR DEF. ANALYSIS, A RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
INVESTMENT PORTFOLIO FOR DIMINISHING MANUFACTURING SOURCES AND 
MATERIAL SHORTAGES (June 2018), https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/ 
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network analyses of patent data and scientometric data to predict 
future technologies in the context of supply chain logistics and 
lifecycle management.213 The Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (“DARPA”) has undertaken efforts to improve the 
computing infrastructure necessary to perform such analyses.214 It 
could not be determined whether DARPA also has an FTA 
capability. A review of the National Intelligence Strategy of the 
United States did not unearth any discussion of FTA tools or reveal 
the use of such analyses in intelligence products.215 A review of 
National Science Foundation funding reveals research in big data 
and information data science generally, but did not specifically 
                                                 
publications/a/ar/a-research-and-development-investment-portfolio-for-diminishing-
manufacturing-sources-and-material-shortages/d-9148.ashx [https://perma.cc/2UZ9-
5MHY]. The fact that one could not identify machine learning FTA capabilities in 
other DOD Departments does not mean they do not exist, just that they were not 
searchable. The U.S. Air Force released an ambitious new science and technology 
strategy in April 2019. U.S. AIR FORCE, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
STRATEGY: STRENGTHENING USAF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR 2030 
AND BEYOND iii (2019), https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/2019 
%20SAF%20story%20attachments/Air%20Force%20Science%20and%20T
echnology%20Strategy.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7YV-Y9T4] Within that 
strategy document, the Air Force states: “Instead of [reacting to others’ advances and] 
looking where potential adversaries are heading, the Air Force scientific and technical 
enterprise will predict where adversaries cannot easily go and then ensure the Air 
Force gets there first.” Id. Although this statement implies use of FTA capabilities, 
subsequent statements by Air Force officials suggest that no process yet exists to 
establish which kinds of programs these efforts might consist of, and that research 
decisions might be made after consultations with industry and stakeholders, indicating 
that FTA is not used in the decision making process. Jon Harper, Air Force Unveils 
Long-Awaited S&T Strategy, NAT’L DEF. (Apr. 17, 2019), 
https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2019/4/17/breaking-air-force-
unveils-long-awaited-st-strategy [https://perma.cc/ 44S7-LQLD].  
 213 NASH ET AL., supra note 212, at 2. 
 214 Extracting Insight from the Data Deluge Is a Hard-to-Do Must-Do, DARPA 
(June 2, 2017), https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2017-06-02 [https://perma.cc/ 
JLB3-SWQM]. 
 215 See generally DANIEL R. COATS, U.S. INTEL. CMTY., NATIONAL 
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reveal investment in the development of FTA tools of the type 
presently under discussion.216 
The Navy and Defense Logistics Agency’s tools are used to 
manage the lifecycles of existing military technology.217 The 
Authors’ research revealed no evidence that their FTA capabilities 
are coupled with R&D efforts in ways other than supply chain 
management and support of existing and near-term military 
platforms. Utilization of FTA insights in this manner is not 
inappropriate but is decoupled from execution of an Innovation 
Warfare counterstrategy, wherein the prediction of future strategic 
technologies has a broader national security purpose. Direct 
coupling of FTA results to other innovation and intellectual property 
management functions, such as patent acquisition, strategic 
planning, basic research priorities, or technology transfer goals, was 
not observed. Of the observed FTA capabilities, all were of the 
exploratory type, and none were of the normative type. Both types 
are valuable to Innovation Warfare countermeasures. 
The United States, through the Department of Defense and/or 
the Director of Science and Technology within the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, must urgently fund and further 
develop both exploratory and normative FTA capabilities based on 
machine learning and big data mining toolsets.218 The government 
                                                 
 216 Harnessing the Data Revolution, NAT’L SCI. FOUND., https://www.nsf.gov/news/ 
special_reports/big_ideas/harnessing.jsp [https://perma.cc/2HPJ-J4ZL] (identifying ten 
areas of primary focus for NSF research where one, “Harnessing the Data 
Revolution,” focuses on improved education, development of necessary cyber and 
IT infrastructure, and basic research in information science). The Authors 
additionally reviewed the list of National Science Foundation (“NSF”) awards 
given on the NSF website using a variety of search terms and by inspection of 
recently granted awards, and they were unable to identify any focused research in 
FTA tools. 
217 See also Rosson, supra note 212; Summers, supra note 212; see generally NASH 
ET AL., supra note 212 (reviewing publicly available research literature for Navy and 
Defense Logistics Agency tools yields works similar to the above all focused on 
lifecycle management; the fact the Authors’ research did not identify other FTA tools 
and uses does not mean they do not exist, only that they are not currently published). 
 218 50 U.S.C. §§ 3030, 3191 (authorizing the Director of Science and 
Technology within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to lead and 
fund scientific advances in intelligence gathering as well as the awarding of 
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must further design a mechanism for sharing and supplying the 
results of FTA as input to the government’s Innovation Warfare 
strategic planning process. Much like in the aftermath of 9/11, where 
the government devised a way for agencies to share intelligence data 
about potential terrorist threats, the government should develop 
means for sharing the methodologies and the results of FTA 
intelligence across agencies.219 
In addition, the United States government must devise a 
mechanism for making some form of FTA available to the private 
sector. The Chinese government routinely provides FTA services to 
its businesses and corporations, creating a significant competitive 
advantage for Chinese firms.220 Specifically, the Chinese National 
Science Library helps Chinese technology-based firms improve 
their innovation capabilities, identify potential R&D partners, 
identify innovation pathways, and otherwise conduct “industrial 
technology and development strategizing.”221 These services are 
provided in “13 key scientific fields,” although the literature fails to 
list those fields.222 
As documented below, other precedents exist for government 
provision of technological competitive intelligence to the private 
sector, albeit with earlier generation tools. Many patent offices, 
including the Canadian and Scandinavian Patent Offices, routinely 
perform such analyses for their fellow government agencies and 
their constituent companies.223 The Nordic Patent Institute, a 
                                                 
educational grants for graduate studies in these areas); Id. § 3038 (authorizing the 
Secretary of Defense to allocate funds to satisfy the intelligence needs of the 
military as well as other departments and agencies). 
 219 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 458, 
118 Stat. 3638 (2004) (creating the Information Sharing Environment managed 
by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence upon the recommendations 
of the 9/11 Commission). 
 220 See Liu et al., supra note 207, at 322–23. 
 221 Id. at 321. 
 222 Id. at 323. 
 223 See Jonathan Calof, Reflections on the Canadian Government in Competitive 
Intelligence – Programs and Impacts, 19 FORESIGHT 1, 31–47 (Mar. 13, 2017); see 
also CANADIAN INTEL. PROP. OFFICE, PATENT LANDSCAPE REPORT: SHALE OIL AND 
GAS 2 (2016), https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/vwapj/Shale 
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combination of three Scandinavian Patent Offices, routinely offers 
their patent examiners time and expertise on a consulting basis to 
assist companies with a variety of issues.224 The Singapore Patent 
Office has also started providing such a service to its companies.225 
The World Intellectual Property Organization, a United Nations 
organization, is mandated to provide patent landscape reports in 
specific technology fields to developing countries.226 
Although the U.S. Patent Office makes complete patent datasets 
available for download, the Office does not make FTA tools or 
services available to private U.S. citizens and corporations.227 On 
information and belief, the U.S. Patent Office does not provide such 
tools or analysis to the private sector, likely because first-generation 
tools are readily available for purchase in the marketplace. The 
Authors believe that unlike earlier generation analytic tools, the 
computing infrastructure, and data mining competencies required to 
perform modern FTA analysis make this capability unavailable to 
all but the most sophisticated and well-capitalized entities. There is 
little likelihood that sophisticated FTA tools will be available for 
purchase in the marketplace in a reasonable time period. The United 
States could consider licensing a less capable version of its FTA 
tools to a private firm for commercialization.228 Until such time, 
significant competitive advantage accrues to Chinese firms with 
access to these enhanced FTA capabilities. One must be aware of 
                                                 
-Oil-Gas-report-May-2017.pdf/$file/Shale-Oil-Gas-report-May-2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CJA5-2RRG] (exemplifying an industry competitive patent 
analysis performed by a national patent office). 
 224 Nordic Experts in Global Prior Art Searching, NORDIC PAT. INST., www.npi.int 
[https://perma.cc/6DJL-X3DY]. 
 225 Growing Your Business with IP, INTELL. PROP. OFF. OF SING., 
https://www.ipos.gov.sg/growing-your-business-with-ip [https://perma.cc/KWW3-
JHFB]. 
 226 Patent Landscape Reports, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
https://www.wipo.int/patentscope/en/programs/patent_landscapes/ 
[https://perma.cc/C8RR-YD34] (last visited Mar. 12, 2020). 
 227 Bulk Data Products, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https:// 
www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/bulk-data-products [https://perma.cc/MF2H-
N3FK] (last visited Feb. 21, 2020). 
 228 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (encouraging the licensing of inventions arising from 
federally funded research). 
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the possible future(s) if one is to take the actions necessary to chart 
a course towards the preferred future and innovate competitively in 
both the government and private sector. 
B. Strategic Technology Development – Optimize and Scope 
Federal R&D Spending to Seed the Innovations Necessary to 
Attain the Preferred Future 
Innovation creates the products and services that transition a 
technological future from possibility to reality. One must invest in, 
and undertake, the R&D activities necessary to create the associated 
innovations in order to implement and drive towards a preferred 
technological future. Research and development are the engines of 
innovation. 
The United States leads the world in R&D expenditures, but 
China is on pace to catch up.229 Figure 8 compares the United States' 
total expenditures on R&D to the expenditures made by China and 
Europe. China made large and significant investments in R&D after 
2001, with its total investment rapidly approaching the total R&D 
investment in the U.S. economy. In 2016, the magnitude of Chinese 
R&D investment in PPP dollars exceeded the combined R&D 
investment of all European Union countries. 
 
Figure 8. Total R&D Investment in Current PPP Dollars230 
                                                 
 229 Irwin, supra note 46.  
 230 See COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 53. 
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The allocation of R&D investment dollars has increasingly 
shifted from the public to the private sector in the U.S. economy 
over the last several decades.231As seen in Figure 9, at its peak in 
1966, federal R&D spending made up sixty-seven percent of the 
total expenditures on R&D in the economy. By 2018, this 
percentage had dropped to twenty-two percent. 
 
Figure 9. Changes in the Proportion of Federal and Private Sector 
R&D Expense232 
The reallocation of R&D spending from the federal government 
to the private sector has many benefits, but also introduces some 
risks. These risks include the increased susceptibility of unhardened 
private sector facilities and information to unsanctioned access in a 
globally interconnected world.233 These risks also include market 
failures which underproduce the type of innovations needed by the 
military. As with the space program, profit-driven firms may be less 
                                                 
 231 JOHN F. SARGENT, JR., CONG. RSCH SERV., R44307, U.S. RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT FUNDING AND PERFORMANCE: FACT SHEET, 1–2 (2020), https:// 




 233 Jeanne Suchodolski, Cybersecurity of Autonomous Systems in the 
Transportation Sector: An Examination of Regulatory and Private Law 
Approaches with Recommendations for Needed Reforms, 20 N.C. J. OF L. & TECH. 
121, 130 (2018) (noting that cybersecurity issues must now be managed across a 
global logistics and supply chain; and additionally noting that shared service 
models and outsourcing introduces additional business security risks and 
vulnerabilities). 
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inclined to undertake fundamental, early-stage, or high-risk research 
of the type not likely to produce commercial products in a viable 
time frame. 
Although federal R&D spending has increased in real dollars, as 
shown in Figure 10, federal funding, as a percentage of GDP, has 
steadily declined with the ending of the Cold War.234 This “peace 
dividend” also coincided with the reallocation of the nation’s 
research spending to the private sector. 
 
Figure 10. Federal R&D as a Share of GDP235 
Federal R&D expenditures have had an influential effect on the 
pace of innovation in the economy.236 Figure 11 illustrates this 
correlation. Even though total R&D spending continues to increase 
as a percentage of GDP, TFP has declined as federal spending has 
decreased.237 While correlation does not equal causation, studies 
have shown that U.S. government research has been critical in the 
development of many of the technology revolutions of the twentieth 
                                                 






 236 MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: DEBUNKING 
PRIVATE VS. PUBLIC SECTOR MYTHS 68–70 (2013), https://nsf.gov/statistics/ 
2018/nsb20181/assets/nsb20181.pdf [https://perma.cc/BA57-RCQ3].  
 237 Data compiled from National Science Board and Bureau of Labor and 
Statistics. 
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century.238 One study indicated that approximately thirty percent of 
all granted U.S. patents derive from federally funded research.239 
 
Figure 11. TFP relative to federal R&D and total R&D 
expenditures240 
Evidence of the importance of the state’s role in innovation goes 
beyond financing basic research. The state’s role additionally 
includes the financing of applied research and the development of 
markets in fundamental new areas such as: IT, semiconductors, 
space, nanotech, alternative energy, and medicine through DARPA, 
ARPA-E, NIH, SFIR, orphan drugs, etc.241 The Apollo Program not 
only put a man on the moon, but it financed an era of U.S. 
technological superiority.242 The government has the unique ability 
                                                 
 238 See, e.g., MAZZUCATO, supra note 236. 
 239 L. Flemming et al., Government-Funded Research Increasingly Fuels 
Innovation, 364 SCI. 1139, 1139–41 (2019). 
 240 Data compiled from National Science Board and Bureau of Labor and 
Statistics. 
 241 See MAZZUCATO, supra note 236, at 79–90. 
 242 Robert Gallagher, How the Apollo Program Produced Economic Wealth, 14 
EIR 24, 24–29 (1987). But see Erika K. Carlson, Apollo Boosted the Economy, 
Just Not the Way You Think, ASTRONOMY (May 31, 2019), 
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to invest in early-stage technology areas that might otherwise 
constitute too speculative a financial undertaking for a private 
firm.243 Preliminary development of early-stage technologies, up to 
the point where private actors can invest, apportions innovation risk 
and innovation labor in an economically efficient way.244 
Additionally, U.S. research grants and investments have been 
instrumental in building public-private partnerships, and the 
corresponding formation of geographic concentrations of 
specialized innovation expertise.245 Federal Cold War-era spending 
on research concentrated research dollars at a few major 
universities, thereby seeding the formation of innovation clusters in 
Silicon Valley, Boston’s Route 128, and Austin, Texas.246 Examples 
from Silicon Valley alone abound. The research that led to Google 
was federally funded.247 Apple’s iPhone relied on key technologies 
created using federal funding.248 
Investments in federal R&D spending are, therefore, critical to 
add capacity to America’s overall innovation and R&D efforts and 
to outperform Chinese spending on R&D innovation along future 
                                                 
https://astronomy.com/news/2019/05/apollo-boosted-the-economy-just-not-the-
way-you-think [https://perma.cc/53XZ-RTZA] (documenting an ongoing 
research project by academics Alexander Whalley and Shawn Kantor to assess 
the economic impact of the Apollo Program). 
 243 See MAZZUCATO, supra note 236 at 63–70. 
 244 Id. 
 245 See also Mazzucato, supra note 236, at 101; see generally STATE OF 
INNOVATION: THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT 
(Fred L. Block & Matthew R. Keller eds., Paradigm Publishers 2011) (finding 
that between 1971-2006, 88% of the most important innovations—as rated by 
R&D Magazine’s annual awards—have been dependent on federal research 
support).  
 246 See O’MARA, supra note 25, at 93–103. 
 247 Nafeez Ahmed, How the CIA Made Google, part 1, MEDIUM INSURGE 
INTELL. (Jan. 22, 2015), https://medium.com/insurge-intelligence/how-the-cia-
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eventually became Google’s search engine was in part funded by National Science 
Foundation grants from the Digital Library Initiative). 
 248 See MAZZUCATO, supra note 236, at 93–103. 
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technology trajectories.249 Reliance on increased private sector 
spending is insufficient to ensure investment in early-stage and 
emerging technologies and to ensure America has a position on the 
technology roadmaps of the future. A reexamination of the 
recommendations in Table 1 reveals a strong consensus on this 
point, with more than half of the total recommendations advocating 
for an expansion of the country’s R&D capacity. Agencies and 
Departments should allocate between 0.5% and 1% of their budgets 
to research in those technology areas relevant to securing the 
preferred technology future(s) whether via direct research or via 
research grant programs. 
R&D investments by the Department of Defense are particularly 
impactful. Figure 12 diagrams the current allocation of federal R&D 
funds. The Department of Defense funds nearly half of all federal 
research, hence its research programs are not only vital to advancing 
the technological superiority of the military, but also to underwriting 
research in key technology areas for the economy as a whole. 
 
Figure 12. 2019 Federal R&D Expenditures250 
                                                 
 249 DOD’s Role in Competing with China: Testimony before the House Armed Servs. 
Comm., 116th Cong. 3–4 (Jan. 15, 2020) (statement of Michele A. Flournoy, Former 
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Despite this reality, a recent study showed Department of 
Defense R&D spending fails to fully align with the emerging 
technologies prioritized by the National Defense Strategy.251 The 
Department of Defense has yet to make serious commitments to 
investing in those key technologies.252 Recently, the White House 
issued guidance to the heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies, including the Department of Defense, directing specific 
actions to remedy this state of affairs.253 In a Memorandum dated 
August 2020, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget 
defined R&D budget priorities for fiscal year 2022.254 The 
Memorandum identified five R&D spending priorities and four 
supporting actions Agencies must fund in the coming budgetary 
cycle.255 
Even when the Department of Defense does expend funds on 
prioritized technology areas, fifty-nine percent of those funds go to 
just ten contractors.256 These ten contractors consist of the usual 
defense industry specialists, as shown in Table 2. While these 
defense industry partners no doubt have immense capabilities, such 
spending patterns are not likely to generate new economic clusters 
of expertise. These spending patterns also limit the military’s access 
to innovations of the type generated by young start-ups and 
entrepreneurial firms. There exists a need to diversify R&D spending 
                                                 
ap_21_research-fy2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/DBS8-TX7N] (calculating numbers in 
chart based on tabulated amounts). 
 251 GOVINI, AMERICA’S ERODING TECHNICAL ADVANTAGE: NATIONAL DEFENSE 
STRATEGY RDT&E PRIORITIES IN AN ERA OF GREAT-POWER COMPETITION WITH 
CHINA 3 (2020) https://www.govini.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Govini_NDS-
RDTE-Priorities-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/99TF-EUYR]. 
 252 See DOD’s Role in Competing with China: Testimony before the House 
Armed Servs. Comm., 116th Cong. 6 (Jan. 15, 2020) (statement of Andrew Hunter, 
Director, Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group and Senior Fellow, International 
Security Program, CSIS), https://armedservices.house.gov/_cache/files/4/ 4/44fbef3d-
138c-4a0a-b3a9-2f05c898578f/0E4943A5BFAEDA465D485A166FABCF5F.20200 
115-hasc-michele-flournoy-statement-vfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/VLP5-D2JU].  
 253 See VOUGHT, supra note 183 (directing agencies to prioritize spending in 
five key research areas and expanding those areas to include public health). 
 254 Id. at 2. 
 255 Id. 
 256 GOVINI, supra note 251. 
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to access early-stage technologies at less traditional firms.257 The 
White House appears to have recognized this fact since the National 
Strategy for Critical and Emerging Technologies advocates for 
increased collaboration with the private sector and academia, as well 
as a stated willingness to leverage private capital and expertise to 
maintain the national security innovation base.258 
Table 2: Top Ten Firms Receiving DOD Funding for Research in Key 
Technology Areas259 
 
A robust Innovation Warfare strategy consistently aligns 
government R&D spending, particularly Department of Defense 
R&D spending, with the preferred technological future(s). 
Accomplishing this task requires a strong focus on technology 
governance and means for continuously evaluating the capabilities 
and effectiveness of the R&D machinery. Application of FTA 
toolsets can be especially helpful in constructing feedback loops to 
assess R&D performance and infrastructure needs.260 Figure 13 
diagrams these feedback loops. These feedback loops can assess 
whether sufficient innovation activity is occurring along the 
preferred technology roadmaps or whether additional funding or 
emphasis areas are needed to maintain progress along the desired 
course. For example, for those critical technologies identified by the 
                                                 
 257 Id.; see also James Serbu, Navy Picks 5 Sites for ‘tech bridges’ to Push Fleet 
Innovation, FED. NEWS NETWORK (Sept. 5, 2019) https://federalnewsnetwork. 
com/navy/2019/09/navy-picks-5-sites-for-tech-bridges-to-push-fleet-innovation/ 
[https://perma.cc/9QFL-P5Y7] (describing Navy initiatives to identify and 
partner with nontraditional sources of innovation). In the Authors’ experience, 
many firms, including some large tech companies, lack familiarity with federal 
contracting and view the overhead burdensome, leaving the Department of 
Defense with limited visibility into and limited access to the innovations created 
by such firms. 
 258 WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 155, at 7. 
 259 GOVINI, supra note 251, at 18 (Figure 12). 
 260 See JEFFREY ALEXANDER ET. AL, BIG DATA AND THE FUTURE OF R&D 
MANAGEMENT: A PRIMER ON BIG DATA FOR INNOVATION 14–15 (2017). 
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National Strategy for Critical and Emerging Technologies, as 
technologies in which the United States must lead, the feedback 
loops in Figure 13 can assist in tracking relevant innovation activity 
against the goal. These feedback loops are also useful for evaluating 
the strength and performance of the innovation infrastructure and 
R&D ecosystem. In particular, FTA tools can help identify R&D 
partners, detect concentrations of prolific inventors, assess human 
capital and education needs, and evaluate overall capabilities in the 
context of prioritized critical technology fields. 
 
Figure 13. Feedback and Control Loops for Innovation Process 
Optimization 
The United States is a free market economy with a bias towards 
believing actions taken freely within that economy will naturally 
produce optimum results. Advocating for proactive management 
and measurement of federal R&D spending to achieve a preferred 
future(s) does not equate to advocating for top-down central 
planning of the economy. Rather, proactive management of federal 
R&D spending should include mechanisms that couple federal 
research investment to Innovation Warfare strategy. Tracking the 
effectiveness of those investments in creating the innovations that 
implement the preferred technological future(s) provides situational 
awareness and the insight to adjust course as necessary. 
C. Secure Technology Control Position – Intellectual Property as 
an Armament of Innovation Warfare 
Seizing the preferred technological future(s) goes beyond 
defining and acquiring the innovations needed to implement it. 
Seizing the preferred technological future(s) also means influencing 
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others to accept or support the attainment of that future in lieu of a 
less preferred alternative future(s). In private industry, commercial 
entities are well versed at utilizing multiple forms of control 
positions to gain and hold a strategic advantage over competitors, as 
each competes for future markets.261 These control positions include 
first-mover advantages, economies of scale, superior distribution 
networks, preferential positions in the supply chain, and intellectual 
property.262 On a national scale, control positions might include 
acquiring a monopoly or sole access to a key resource such as 
helium, sand, or subject matter experts.263 There are multiple forms 
and types of control positions useful for safeguarding and securing 
the ability to influence others in the adoption and attainment of a 
preferred technological future(s). Each has value and importance in 
Innovation Warfare, but the following discussion is limited to just a 
single type: intellectual property. 
Intellectual property is a useful concept for the development of 
technology-based control positions.264 Intellectual property exists at 
the intersection of technology and the set of possible control 
                                                 
 261 See, e.g., MICHAEL PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 11–15 (1985). 
 262 Id. 
 263 See Carmen Chappell & Jordan Smith, The Worldwide Helium Shortage 
Affects Everything from MRIs to Rockets— Here’s Why, CNBC (June 21, 2019) 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/21/helium-shortage-why-the-worlds-supply-is-
drying-up.html [https://perma.cc/5MXM-HYTQ] (stating that the United States 
controls most of the world’s helium supply); see also Vince Beiser, He Who 
Controls the Sand: The Mining ‘Mafias’ Killing Each Other to Build Cities, 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 28, 2017) https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/feb/28/ 
sand-mafias-killing-each-other-build-cities [https://perma.cc/YK8W-WE97] 
(describing how sand is a critical resource in cement—a necessity in building 
construction—and spurring a mad race to dominate sand distribution and supply); 
see also Danny Lewis, Why the U.S. Government Brought Nazi Scientists to 
America After World War II, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Nov. 16, 2016) 
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/why-us-government-brought-nazi-
scientists-america-after-world-war-ii-180961110/ [https://perma.cc/9KXM-7RBQ] 
(describing why 88 Nazi scientists were brought to America so that the U.S. could 
acquire German technology but also to prevent the Soviets from acquiring the 
scientists). 
    264 See ULF PETRUSSON, RESEARCH AND UTILIZATION 390 (2016) (describing 
the mapping of intellectual property-based control positions in the technology 
context). 
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positions, as diagrammed in Figure 14. Properly wielded intellectual 
property can be a powerful mechanism with which to ensure the 
desired technological future is attained.  
 
Figure 14. Intellectual Property Exists at the 
Intersection of Technology and Control Positions 
There are multiple forms of intellectual property, and each is 
useful for protecting different aspects of innovations.265 All forms of 
intellectual property possess value as a means to prevent others from 
using innovation without permission. Patents are the strongest and 
most familiar of these intellectual property rights and are commonly 
used to build technology-based control positions.266 Although the 
                                                 
 265 Copyrights protect written works, software code and databases. See 17 
U.S.C. §§ 101–1332. Trademarks protect avatars, comic book characters, and 
business names. Performance rights protect musicians’ recorded works. See 17 
U.S.C. §§ 114. And, patents protect useful and novel inventions. 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 100–101. The precise scope and legal definition vary by country, but 
international treaties provide for some minimum commonality and protection 
standards. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994). In some 
jurisdictions, additional forms of intellectual property exist. In the United States, 
for example, trade secret rights protect company proprietary information, such as 
the formula for Coca-Cola that derives its value precisely from the fact that the 
formula remains private. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1836, 1839. Not all countries have 
trade secret rights. 
    266 See SUZANNE S. HARRISON & PATRICK H. SULLIVAN, EDISON IN THE 
BOARDROOM REVISITED 30–33 (2011) 
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following discussion is further limited to patents, the concepts and 
principles described apply to all categories of intellectual property. 
Patents help innovative entities straddle the dimension of time. 
Savvy entities protect innovation value streams both in the present 
and in the future via a portfolio of patents. Many leaders think of 
intellectual property, and patents in particular, as simply a necessary 
defensive expenditure.267 But experienced leaders realize that 
intellectual property is a type of real option that connects current 
R&D investments to future benefits inclusive of the ability to control 
and manage outcomes at a later point in time.268 The difference 
between these two points of view is significant. 
Under U.S. law, a patent is a right to exclude others from 
making, using, or selling the patented invention.269 These rights 
mean that others must have the patent owner’s permission to 
practice the invention claimed in the patent. Therefore, the patent 
owner “controls” how the patented technology is to be utilized and 
holds the option to exercise that right throughout the life of the 
patent. Patents are, therefore, real options on control positions, or 
simply for ease of discussion, control positions.270 
The real option nature of patents, however, nonetheless provides 
key insights on their optimum use as control positions. Entities file 
patent applications hopeful that the resulting patent may prove to be 
of some use or value in the future.271 Often one or more of these 
future anticipated uses of a patent, such as licensing, technology 
transfer, influencing standards-setting or other technology adoption, 
                                                 
    267 Id. 
    268 Id. 
 269 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 
270 See generally Eduardo Schwartz, Patents and R&D as Real Options (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 10114, 2003), https://www.nber.org/ 
system/files/working_papers/w10114/w10114.pdf [https://perma.cc/P884-888A] 
(developing a “simulation approach to value patents and patent-protected R&D 
projects based on the Real Options approach”); PHILIPP N. BAECKER, REAL 
OPTIONS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CAPITAL BUDGETING UNDER 
IMPERFECT PATENT PROTECTION (2007) (describing the use and management of 
a portfolio of patents as real options on R&D investments). 
 271 See HARRISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 266. 
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or stopping infringement, fails to materialize.272 In such a case, the 
patent option is null. But, if one of these uses were to come about, 
the patent option is “called” and the patent often assumes a 
significant amount of value through that use.273 That value, or future 
return, varies depending on the precise use and may not materialize 
at all.274 Thus, not all patents are equally valuable. Entities, 
therefore, try to file as many patents to obtain as many options to 
assert a control position in the future as possible.275 
The first and most obvious means of using patents as control 
positions is to obtain them at all. Every such control position a U.S. 
entity obtains is one that its adversaries do not obtain. In the context 
of Innovation Warfare, patents can be used to own and control 
relevant technology future(s) for U.S. interests. Either a U.S. 
company can own and control a relevant patent asset, or the U.S. 
government can own and control the patent asset. In either scenario, 
a U.S. entity, not an adversary, owns and controls the patent asset. 
Patent portfolio size need not, however, be unbounded. Nor, 
does there exist a magic number to own. In the Authors’ experience, 
different industries and technologies utilize patents differently. For 
this reason, caution must be exercised when attempting to establish 
a desired number of patent assets solely by reference to the size of 
the R&D investment. The right number of patents, or control 
positions, to own is both a statistical and financial question. In an 
ideal world, an entity wants to own enough patents so that when they 
reach into their portfolio in response to a given scenario, they would 
be statistically likely to find an executable option. Realistically, the 
size of the portfolio becomes limited by the financial costs of 
acquiring it and maintaining it. 
In Innovation Warfare, the strategic objective for acquiring 
patents can be more precise, and hence more precision can be 
obtained in defining, scoping, and evaluating the portfolio, by 
coupling the patent acquisition efforts to the FTA and R&D 
                                                 
 272 Id. 
 273 Id. 
 274 Id. 
 275 Id. 
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initiatives previously described. White space is often defined as the 
emergent technological areas just beginning to be populated by 
inventions.276 By patenting in white space areas, one begins to own 
and control the technological future. From the previous discussion 
of the FTA analysis, one can see that FTA serves as a sophisticated 
and systematic means to chart white spaces of strategic interest. 
From the previous discussion of R&D investments, one can see the 
federal government, and in particular the Department of Defense, 
has an outsized role in funding the research likely to generate 
inventions in these strategic white space areas. Thus, the federal 
government, and in particular the Department of Defense, plays an 
important role in securing the patent control positions most relevant 
to an Innovation Warfare counterstrategy. 
Table 3 lists, by Agencies, the approximate number of patents 
acquired by the U.S. government in 2019. The number of overseas 
patents applied for and issued to the United States is not given in 
Table 3. Agencies who originate patent applications do not also 
always possess the authority to file and prosecute patent applications 
overseas.277 These Agencies make recommendations to the 
Department of Commerce, which then files such cases in 
appropriate jurisdictions as desired.278 The totals provided in Table 
3 are consistent with yearly totals for the previous five years. The 
Department of Defense receives more than half of all government 
patents, and the Navy receives the largest percentage of these. In 
light of this discussion and the proposals to follow, government 
agencies, and especially the Department of Defense, may wish to 
reevaluate and recommit to patenting activity. 
                                                 
 276 As practitioners in this area the Authors have relayed their understanding of 
the use of this term from their professional experience. 
 277 3 C.F.R. §§ 1943–1948 Comp. 651–52 (2020) (stating that all government 
departments and agencies who acquire title to inventions shall inform the 
Department of Commerce; and the Department of Commerce shall determine 
whether, and in what foreign jurisdictions the United States shall file foreign 
patent applications). 
 278 Id. 
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Table 3: Approximate Number of Patents Issued to U.S. Government 2019279 
 
In an Innovation Warfare race with China to secure control 
positions on the technological future, a numbers game is being 
played over time. Chinese nationals currently file more patent 
applications than nationals of any other country.280 According to a 
recent study, “[i]f women, minorities, and children from low-
income families were to invent at the same rate as white men from 
high-income (top twenty percent) families, the rate of innovation in 
America would quadruple.”281 In recognition of this fact, Congress 
passed the Success Act in 2018 to promote the inclusion of 
underutilized groups, specifically women, minorities, and veterans, 
into the invention and patenting process.282 Veterans comprise 
approximately forty-seven percent of the civilian workforce at the 
Department of Defense.283 For this additional reason, the 
Department of Defense may have significant opportunities to 
expand its patenting activities. Acquiring patents and putting control 
position options into U.S. hands and away from adversaries is, by 
itself, a win for the United States. 
                                                 
 279 The numbers provided in Table 3 were generated from an assignee search of 
the U.S. Patent Office database using online search tools and are believed 
approximate but representative of the actual numbers. 
 280 WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., WIPO FACTS AND FIGURES 2019 12 (2019), 
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_943_2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KZQ9-2VA3]. 
 281 Alex Bell et al., Who Becomes an Inventor in America? The Importance of 
Exposure to Innovation, 134 Q. J. ECON. 647, 653 (2018). 
 282 Study of Underrepresented Classes Chasing Engineering and Science 
Success Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-273, § 3, 132 Stat. 4158. 
 283 U.S. OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., EMPLOYMENT OF VETERANS IN THE FEDERAL 
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Once obtained, a variety of tactics exist to exercise the option on 
and to extract strategic advantage from patents. Licensing is one 
such tactic. For a myriad of reasons, this avenue has the greatest 
promise in an Innovation Warfare context. Specifically, judicious 
use of licensing activities by the federal government can promote 
U.S. innovation and foster the growth of emerging industries. For 
precisely these reasons, Congress directed that federally funded 
research be patented and licensed.284 
In compliance with Congress’s wishes, the Department of 
Defense includes Technology Transfer Offices within each agency 
responsible for the licensing of defense technology.285 Existing 
Department of Defense licensing programs have produced 
noteworthy and measurable outcomes on the U.S. economy.286 To 
make licensing a truly effective Innovation Warfare counterstrategy, 
however, requires augmentation of current licensing practices 
coupled with direction to align those efforts with the strategic 
objectives. Current licensing transactions mostly consist of the 
consummation of ad hoc targets of opportunity, untethered to the 
types of strategic goals articulated herein, and conceived and 
implemented in the context of a single deal. 
                                                 
 284 Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (establishing that “[i]t is the policy 
and objective of the Congress to use the patent system to promote the utilization 
of inventions arising from federally supported research or development”). 
 285 Id. § 209 (describing the authority and policies for licensing of federally 
owned inventions); Instructions from Dep’t of Defense, DoD Technology 
Transfer (T2) Program, at Instruction 5535.8 (May 14, 1999), 
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/553508p.pdf?
ver=2018-10-22-082514-847 [https://perma.cc/E5WM-ZV8U] (implementing the 
policies and procedures for licensing Department of Defense Technology Transfer 
programs and allocating responsibility for this function to the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering). 
 286 See TECHLINK & UNIV. OF COLO. SCH. OF BUS., NATIONAL ECONOMIC 
IMPACTS FROM DOD LICENSE AGREEMENTS WITH U.S. INDUSTRY 5 (2018), 
https://www.nsa.gov/Portals/70/documents/what-we-do/research/technology-
transfer/DoD-Licensing-Study-2017.pdf?ver=2019-08-07-133426-037 
[https://perma.cc/3VUA-795B] (finding that as of 2017, existing DoD licensing 
programs had produced $58 billion in total economic impact nationwide, $27 billion 
in new product sales, and created 214,791 jobs). 
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Three more sophisticated licensing practices offer more 
effective alternatives. Each of these three licensing alternatives 
utilizes patent-based control positions to build strategic openness.287 
Strategic openness promotes attainment of the preferred 
technological future(s) by influencing and enabling others to adopt 
the technologies underlying it. 
The first of these alternatives, and with a past history of success, 
involves revitalization of patent pools. The United States 
successfully utilized patent pools to ensure the viability of the 
emerging radio and aviation industries.288 Patent pools gather those 
patents required to participate in a given industry into a single lot 
available for license.289 Patent pools are thus pro-competition and 
economically efficient. The patent owner receives royalties for the 
patents placed into the pool, while industry participants receive a 
license in exchange for those royalties.290 Pools have the effect of 
de-risking entry into new technology areas since the likelihood of 
being sued for patent infringement is reduced. Patent pools currently 
exist for DVDs, MPEG, and RFID technologies, to name but a 
few.291 In industries without these cross-license pooling 
arrangements, firms must negotiate for needed licenses on an 
inefficient, piecemeal basis.292 In industries without patent pools, 
and where patents are abundant, firms face an increased risk of 
expensive patent infringement suits.  
                                                 
 287 Strategic openness influences or enables the adoption of a preferred 
technology by granting others the ability to “see” or “use” it. See XIAN XU ET AL., 
STRATEGIC OPENNESS AND OPEN STRATEGY 50–84 (David Seidl, Georg von 
Krogh & Richard Whittington eds., 2019). 
 288 Robert Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The 
Case of Patent Pools 28 (Aug. 1999) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/pools.pdf [https://perma.cc/PF3J-WACJ]; 
Kevin Closson, Patent Pools, SPIE (Sept. 30, 2009), https://spie.org/news/spie-
professional-magazine-archive/2009-october/patent-pools?SSO=1 
[https://perma.cc/423A-UV6D]. 
 289 Id. 
 290 Id. 
 291 Id. 
 292 Id. 
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Patent pools thus encourage United States entrants into 
emerging technology areas while creating a preference for the 
particular technologies covered by the pool. Even if Chinese 
companies were licensed under the pool, those Chinese firms would 
still be advancing a preferred technological future as embodied by 
the technologies and license conditions of the pool. 
Public-private sector cooperation on the formation of patent 
pools in next generation technologies should be further investigated 
as a means to establish control positions and foster industry growth 
in those technologies. The creation of such pools similar to that used 
for radio creates a stronger American innovation ecosystem. 
The second advanced licensing concept bears even more 
promise. This relatively new model is known as “License on 
Transfer” (“LOT”).293 The model operates on a concept similar to 
vaccines. In the context of an Innovation Warfare counterstrategy, a 
LOT licensing model works to “inoculate” U.S. industry from 
patents acquired by a non-U.S. entity. More specifically, for patents 
derived from U.S. government-funded research, whether held by a 
private contractor, grantee, or the U.S. government, the patentee 
would sign an agreement pledging that if the patent asset were ever 
transferred to a non-U.S. or non-ally entity, any U.S. company 
would immediately obtain a non-exclusive license under that patent. 
In this way, the U.S.-funded invention process would protect U.S. 
innovators from future lawsuits, should that patent subsequently 
wind up in the portfolio of an adversary or an adversary’s firms.294 
                                                 
 293 Ken Seddon, Invest in Growth: How LOT Network Addresses the PAE 
Problem, LOTNETWORK (June 5, 2017), https://lotnet.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/Introduction-of-LOT-2.0-For-Startups_NonLegal-v5.1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VT5T-SYMC]. 
 294 Although 35 U.S.C. § 209 specifies certain preconditions for licensing 
federally owned inventions, the License on Transfer (“LOT”) concepts discussed 
here go further. For example, 35 U.S.C. § 209(b) states that licenses to federally 
owned inventions are normally granted only to those who will manufacture 
substantially in the United States. 35 U.S.C. § 2019(b). The Authors believe that 
the LOT provisions could be triggered even if the licensee or their successors in 
interest were not in breach of this provision. Likewise, 35 U.S.C. § 209(d)(1) 
contains a grant-back license enabling any federal agency to practice the invention 
or products embodying it on behalf of the United States. The LOT terms could be 
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The LOT model requires further investigation. The United 
States could include the necessary licensing terms in its patent 
licenses without additional legislation. The acquisition process 
could make such commitments voluntary in exchange for more 
favorable treatment, but mandating such terms may require 
additional legislation or modification of existing regulation. In both 
cases, more thorough legal analysis and implementation plans are 
required. 
The third alternative licensing model is the Library model or 
patent shield model.295 This model ensures start-ups are protected 
from predatory patent lawsuits.296 In the Library model, a large 
number of patents are aggregated either by purchasing them or by 
aggregating the portfolios of many participants.297 Small businesses 
or start-ups in emerging technologies of strategic interest enroll in 
the Library program.298 Should a Library member be threatened with 
litigation by another entity, they can search the Library portfolio for 
any patents that might be asserted in a countersuit or otherwise be 
useful in defeating the litigation efforts.299 If any such patents exist 
within the Library, the relevant patent assets are transferred to the 
start-up; or optionally, the start-up receives an exclusive license that 
enables them to assert that patent in a countersuit.300 The Library 
concept is an additional means through which the federal 
government could incubate and protect the indigenous innovation 
                                                 
drafted to trigger license rights to both the government and U.S. private entities 
upon the occurrence of certain specified events. In addition, LOT terms could be 
made a part of federal contracting such that they would apply to any patents owned 
and developed by private entities in connection with those contracts. Other 
implementations of the LOT concept are possible. 
 295 Suzanne Harrison et al., Licensing 2.0: Corporation’s New Approach to IP 
Monetization, Panel Discussion at Licensing Executive Society Annual Meeting 
(Oct. 23, 2017). 
 296 Id. 
 297 Id. 
 298 Id. 
 299 Id. 
 300 Id. 
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ecosystem, especially in strategic technology areas along future 
technological pathways.301 
Whatever the licensing model, the generation and maintenance 
of a patent portfolio is key to gaining and leveraging control 
positions to advantage American industry. Furthermore, the rights 
embodied in that portfolio must be coupled with existing platforms 
or products and must also constitute a series of carefully placed 
strategic bets representative of emerging technological future(s). 
Coupling a robust patent portfolio with creative licensing is a 
winning tactic in the Innovation Warfare battlespace.302 
                                                 
 301 Other additional models exist but the three most promising models have 
been presented in the main text. Chief among these additional models are patent 
buying funds. These funds protect indigenous companies in emerging industries 
from coercive foreign technology transfer activities. The purpose of the fund is to 
buy patents to be asserted against companies who have forced those indigenous 
companies to license their intellectual property. Korea’s Intellectual Discovery is 
one of the most prolific patent buying funds established for this purpose. About 
ID, INTELL. DISCOVERY, http://www.i-discovery.com/site/en/overview/aboutid.jsp 
[https://perma.cc/KUX5-JXKG] (last visited Mar. 13, 2020). Significant additional 
research would be required to evaluate the benefits and legal authorities for 
federal government agencies to establish or to participate in such funds. 
 302 Patent infringement lawsuits are an additional control position tactic. Patent 
infringement lawsuits can be brought in federal court before the International 
Trade Commission. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a); 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B). Patent 
infringement lawsuits, however, present challenges that make them less attractive 
than licensing as an Innovation Warfare counterstrategy. Lawsuits are incredibly 
expensive and resource intensive. In the federal government, the Department of 
Justice has responsibility for filing and litigating patent infringement cases. 
Unlike a licensing-based approach, implementing a litigation-based 
counterstrategy would require significant financial commitment and coordination 
across government agencies. Relying on private parties to execute litigation 
tactics in the context of Innovation Warfare is also not likely to achieve significant 
strategic outcomes. Not only are private parties intimidated by China into 
forgoing this option, but private entities are driven to maximize profitability. 
Private entities get graded on maximizing shareholder value not on the strategic 
goals of an Innovation Warfare defense. Only in rare and highly impactful 
situations is litigation warranted. 
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D. Organize to Win 
The good news is that within each government agency, the 
component pieces and the requisite statutory authority exist to 
execute on the recommendations contained in this Article. On the 
agency level, such as within the Department of Defense, those 
pieces need only be organized and managed for strategic and 
synergistic effect. On a broader level, the Innovation Warfare threat 
demands, as others have also suggested, an integrated government 
approach.303 
Albert Einstein once said, “[i]n the middle of difficulty lies 
opportunity.”304 The fundamental values that Americans hold dear 
are under attack and require new and different strategic thinking and 
organizational mandates to combat this new threat. Innovation 
Warfare as prosecuted by the Chinese amounts to a malign foreign 
influence campaign as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 3021.305 This 
conclusion rests the overall coordination of the response and 
counterstrategy within the province of the National Security 
Council.306 While the concept of “malign foreign influence 
campaigns” is currently thought of in the context of social media 
and election interference, the statutory definition of that phrase is 
much more encompassing.307 Per the statute, “malign foreign 
influence operations and campaigns” means the “coordinated, direct 
or indirect application of national, diplomatic, informational, 
military, economic, business, corruption, educational, and other 
capabilities by hostile foreign powers to affect attitudes, behaviors, 
decisions, or outcomes within the United States.”308 Innovation 
Warfare certainly meets this definition, and the National Security 
Council should be tasked with coordinating the interagency 
response at the highest levels of government, subject to the 
                                                 
 303 See BROWN & SINGH, supra note 2, at 25. 
 304 ALICE CALAPRICE, THE EXPANDED QUOTABLE EINSTEIN 321 (2000). 
 305 See 50 U.S.C. § 3021(h). 
 306 Id. § 3021(g)(1) (“The President shall designate an employee of the National 
Security Council to be responsible for the coordination of the interagency process 
for combating malign foreign influence operations and campaigns.”). 
 307 See id. § 3021(h). 
 308 Id. 
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provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act, as described 
below. 
Congress, through the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2020, has also directed action to be taken.309 Section 
1239 of the Act directs the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary 
of State, in coordination with appropriate government officials, to 
provide an updated strategy to “counter the threat of malign 
influence operations by the People’s Republic of China.”310 This 
updated strategy must include actions to counter seven specific 
elements, including: security measures, information operations, 
cyber measures, political and diplomatic measures, financial 
measures, energy security measures, and promotion of values.311 As 
defined by the Act, an Innovation Warfare counterstrategy as 
described herein falls within the bounds of the political measures 
element.312 Congress also directed the organizational design, for 
implementing the resulting strategy, be defined.313 
Congress further directed the Secretary of Defense, acting 
through the Office of Net Assessment, to conduct studies on 
competitive strategies with respect to China.314 Innovation Warfare 
                                                 
 309 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-
92 §§ 1239, 1253(c), 133 Stat. 1198, 1655, 1671 (2019) (directing the Secretary 
of Defense, through the Office of Net Assessment, to develop no fewer than three 
long-term competitive strategies with respect to the Peoples Republic of China to 
shape strategic competition to the advantage of the United States; and to deliver a 
report on same to Congress). 
 310 Id. § 1239(b) (updating and expands to include China tasking to counter 
malign influence campaigns as previously assigned pursuant to the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018). 
 311 Id. § 1239(a); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 
§ 1239A. 
 312 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 § 1239A (stating 
“[p]rograms and activities to enhance the resilience of United States democratic 
institutions and infrastructure at the national and subnational levels.”).  
 313 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 § 1239(b)(2) 
(stating that “[a] description of the interagency organizational structure and 
procedures for coordinating the implementation of the comprehensive strategy for 
countering malign influence . . . be provided”). 
 314 Id. §§ 1239(b)(2), 1253(c)(1). The Office of Net Assessment is the 
Department of Defense internal “think tank” created in 1973 by Richard Nixon 
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as a competitive strategy prosecuted by China, and against which 
counter-competitive strategies are needed, definitely falls within this 
mandate. Congress directed that no fewer than three 
counter-competitive strategies be developed and reported to 
Congress by December 19, 2020.315 
At the uppermost levels of government, therefore, clear 
authority and delegation of responsibility exist to counter the 
Innovation Warfare threat. The Secretaries of Defense and State 
have the primary responsibility for further defining and developing 
specific Innovation Warfare threat doctrines and 
counterstrategies.316 The National Security Council has the 
responsibility to coordinate implementation of the strategic 
response, and to coordinate information sharing between the White 
House, the Department of Defense, the State Department, and 
various sister agencies. In the context of an Innovation Warfare 
response, these sister agencies include, at a minimum: the 
Department of Commerce, the National Science Foundation, the 
Department of the Treasury, the Department of Justice, the U.S. 
Trade Representative, the Small Business Administration, and the 
Department of Education. The National Security Council, through 
the Office of Director for National Intelligence and the Director of 
Science and Technology, should also cooperate with: (1) the 
Department of Defense in the funding and development of FTA 
tools, and (2) with the Department of Commerce in making some 
version of those tools available in the private sector. 
Beyond setting and orchestrating Innovation Warfare 
counterstrategies at a whole of government level, within the 
                                                 
that looks 20 to 30 years in the future. See Humberto Enrique Lopez Arellano, Net 
Assessment: Creating an Institutional Capacity and General Process To Perform 
It, 17–18 (June 2017) (Thesis, M.A., Naval Postgraduate School), 
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1046458.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6PV-8246] 
(discussing the historical origins and purpose of the Office). 
 315 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 § 1253(c)(2). 
 316 Id. § 1239(b) (updating the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2018, by expanding the Secretary of State and Department of Defense’s role 
to include the development of strategies to counter the malign influence activities 
of China). 
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Department of Defense there exist numerous additional 
opportunities to respond to the Innovation Warfare threat across 
different time dimensions. Recognition that Department of Defense 
priorities and organizational design may need modification is 
growing.317 Opportunities include mobilization and reorganization 
of existing functional units and capabilities to better align with the 
counterstrategy. These opportunities additionally include tasking 
existing functional units and bases of expertise to facilitate capture 
of intellectual property control positions. 
More specifically, each Department must first articulate an 
intellectual property strategy logically connected to and supported 
by the current technology strategy, preferably focusing on the zero 
to ten-year time frame. The intellectual property strategy should 
ideally include patenting goals and technology transfer goals. In 
addition to existing guidance, the technology transfer goals should 
be coupled with activities that push strategic and early-stage 
roadmap technologies into the American innovation base. The 
technology transfer strategy should additionally evaluate and 
incorporate the novel licensing approaches described above. These 
activities will make significant progress in the implementation of a 
fully integrated Intellectual Property Management decision process, 
as diagrammed in Figure 16, and moves patent acquisition and 
licensing activities from mostly ad hoc, independently conducted 
activities, to the realm of the strategic. 
Second, a centralized group within the Department of Defense’s 
senior management level should be created. This newly created 
centralized group would utilize FTA to identify and prioritize the 
multiple possible technological futures which may emerge beyond 
a ten-year time horizon, and additionally, identify the set of possible 
corresponding technology roadmaps. This group would then 
manage the placement of longer-term strategic U.S. control position 
bets along those roadmaps.  
Establishing control positions via patents forms an important 
part of a multi-part control position strategy. Predicting in advance 
                                                 
317 RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43938, RENEWED GREAT POWER 
COMPETITION: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEFENSE–ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (Sept. 30, 
2020) https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43838.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3W4-X6DF]. 
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which specific subset of patent control positions will be the 
“winners,” however, can prove challenging. As noted in the 
previous paragraph and per the process as drawn in Figure 13, patent 
bets are being placed on technologies more than ten years in the 
future. As with most bleeding-edge technologies, there exist 
multiple competing technology roadmaps; each ostensibly 
realizable in the future.318  
A successful Innovation Warfare counterstrategy therefore 
requires placing patent bets across competing roadmaps, and, over 
time, determining which is the most favorable to U.S. interests, and 
then leveraging those control positions to make the preferred 
roadmap the most likely chosen by both industry and allies. In the 
business world this is known as the “beforemath.” Business 
professor and author Stan Davis further elaborates: 
“Many people,” . . . “wait for events to happen and then they react or 
respond to them. When this occurs, people must deal with the aftermath 
of the event. But suppose things were turned around. Suppose you 
decided what it was that you wanted to occur in the future. If you made 
such a decision, and could visualize in your mind’s eye what that future 
looked like, then you could manage the events between your present and 
your desired future . . . you would decide on the future you wanted to 
take place, and then deal with the beforemath of making it happen.”319 
In the patent world, sophisticated companies are already 
performing these tasks routinely.320 One of the benefits of the 
Department of Defense running such a process is that the process 
can more easily be executed on a larger scale, for a larger number of 
technologies, than one single company can do successfully. The 
                                                 
 318 See Yi Zhang, Hongshu Chen & Donghua Zhu, Semi-automatic Technology 
Roadmapping Composing Method for Multiple Science, Technology, and 
Innovation Data Incorporation, ANTICIPATING FUTURE INNOVATION PATHWAYS 
THROUGH LARGE DATA ANALYSIS 13–14 (2016) (surveying existing 
methodologies for creating technology roadmaps and noting that such roadmaps 
can be created in any of multiple dimensions for a given technology, e.g. time, 
policy, market demands; and further noting the previous creation of at least one 
multi-dimensional model for China’s solar cell industry.) The Authors’ also 
collectively individually each have professional experience in the creation of 
technology roadmaps. 
 319 HARRISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 266, at 155. 
 320 See id. 
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Department of Defense senior leadership process can then be 
integrated with the technology transfer function to seed these 
emerging technologies into the private sector via one or more of the 
licensing methods described above. 
Congress has, in fact, requested a subcomponent of this work via 
the National Defense Authorization Act.321 Specifically, Section 232 
of the Act directs the Department of Defense to establish a process 
and policies regarding emerging technologies.322 Emerging 
technologies is further defined to mean: 
[T]echnology determined to be in an emergent phase of development by 
the Secretary of Defense, including quantum computing, technology for 
the analysis of large and diverse sets of data (commonly known as ‘big 
data analytics’), artificial intelligence, autonomous technology, robotics, 
directed energy, hypersonics, biotechnology and such other technology 
as may be defined by the Secretary.323 
This portion of the Act can be read broadly to include innovation 
policies and technology adoption for Innovation Warfare 
countermeasures, as well as nonproliferation and classification efforts. 
Implementing these organizational changes requires a 
significant effort and most importantly, significant top-down 
support. As of this writing, within the Department of Defense, the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering retains 
responsibility for R&D and technology licensing; the Under 
Secretary of Acquisition and Sustainment retains responsibility for 
intellectual property strategy and management of the 
congressionally mandated intellectual property cadre of experts; the 
Office of General Counsel retains responsibility for filing and 
prosecution of patent applications; while responsibility for the 
development and utilization of FTA tools remains dispersed.324 
                                                 
 321 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-
92 § 232, 133 Stat. 1198 (2019) 
 322 Id. § 232(a). 
 323 Id. § 232(d)(2). 
 324 10 U.S.C. §§ 133a, 133b (defining the roles and responsibilities of the Under 
Secretaries of Research and Engineering and of Acquisition and Sustainment 
respectively); Id. § 2322 (allocating management of intellectual property matters 
to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment); Instructions 
from Dep’t of Defense, DoD Technology Transfer (T2) Program, at 2 (May 14, 1999), 
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Relying on licensing functions, patent acquisition functions, and 
strategic decision-making to coordinate across boundaries in a 
meaningful and nimble way is challenging. 
For this reason, private corporations faced with similar 
situations have typically created a senior leadership position to 
oversee and manage strategic intellectual property processes. The 
Department of Defense should evaluate the creation of a Chief 
Intellectual Property Officer (“CIPO”) to facilitate and coordinate 
these processes and to ensure that this structure is replicated 
throughout each constituent Department.325 The creation of this 
position is consistent with Congress’s prior direction that the 
Department of Defense maintain a cadre of intellectual property 
experts.326 The CIPO position may be either an attorney residing in 
the organization’s law department, or a business/management leader 
reporting elsewhere. Statutory authority for either architecture exists 
within the Department of Defense. For example, the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment is tasked in 
part with developing sets of intellectual property and licensing 
strategies.327 Yet, most patent prosecution takes place within the 
Department’s various legal offices, which already put significant 
responsibility on the organization’s patent attorneys to develop the 
requisite intellectual property control position strategies. 
Optionally, a single department, such as, for example, the 
Department of the Navy, could be designated as the executive 
                                                 
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/553508p.pdf?ver=
2018-10-22-082514-847 [https://perma.cc/E5WM-ZV8U] (allocating technology 
licensing functions to the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering); 10 
U.S.C. § 140 (describing the duties of General Counsel as chief legal officer and 
performs such duties as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe; these duties as 
assigned currently include patent prosecution). 
 325 See 10 U.S.C. § 131(b)(9) (permitting the Secretary of Defense to appoint 
“such other offices and officials as may be established by law or the Secretary of 
Defense may establish or designate in the Office”). 
 326 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 § 802. In the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 § 802(c), Congress 
requested an update including a list of the intellectual property experts and their 
reporting and leadership structure. Id. § 802(c).  
 327 10 U.S.C. § 2322(a). 
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agency charged with leading these efforts and effectively serving in 
the CIPO role. 
Figure 16 diagrams the decision architecture and organizational 
design described in the preceding paragraphs. Figure 16 shows a 
structure and allocation of responsibilities for implementing a whole 
of government Innovation Warfare counterstrategy at the highest 
levels with a subsequent allocation of responsibilities and tactical 
implementation at the agency level. Figure 16 illustrates the 
Department of Defense recommendations provided above. 
 
Figure 16. Innovation Warfare Decision and Implementation 
Structure 
Either organizational structure works. The choice frequently 
comes down to who in the organization has the necessary skills to 
fill the CIPO role, given that it requires a mix of both highly 
advanced business and legal skills. When the role is assigned to the 
law department, that department has to recognize the CIPO must 
perform non-attorney-client privileged business tasking and has the 
authority to make management, not just legal, decisions. When the 
role is assigned to a business or managerial unit, the law department 
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must recognize that the CIPO must have portfolio oversight and the 
authority to direct certain portfolio actions. Based on the Authors’ 
collective experience, these reorganization and realignment efforts 
often require a multi-year implementation window. 
Figure 17 diagrams an intellectual property management process 
for implementing the Innovation Warfare counterstrategies described 
herein. Figure 17 shows one possible organizational design and 
process flow wherein the Department of the Navy serves as the 
example. The exact implementation may vary by Department or 
Agency, however, the basic functional process flow has been found 
to constitute a recommended best practice.328 
The precise organizational boundaries demarcated in Figure 17 
may change but the overall process remains fixed. In all cases, 
however, coordination across the many organizational boundaries 
requires a designated leader with the appropriate institutional 
authority, who is specifically tasked with implementing the control 
position and needed intellectual property strategies. In Figure 17, this 
leader is shown as the CIPO per the recommendations given above. 
 
Figure 17. One Example of a Department Organizational Design 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Innovation Warfare is a competitive strategy prosecuted by 
nation states against the innovation infrastructure of the U.S. 
                                                 
 328 See HARRISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 266, at 15–17. 
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Innovation Warfare is a means to a geopolitical end and does not 
constitute economic competition as usual. Countries engaging in 
Innovation Warfare pose both a national security and economic risk 
to the United States because those countries threaten the innovation 
ecosystem at the root of economic power and prosperity, and at the 
root of military technological superiority. 
China is currently prosecuting an Innovation Warfare competitive 
strategy against the United States. As documented and described 
herein, there currently exists a comprehensive, coordinated effort by 
China to acquire U.S. technology and to co-opt the U.S. innovation 
base for its own purposes. A future in which China prevails in the 
Innovation Warfare “fight” is one in which the United States cedes the 
technological future to another, and one in which its geopolitical power 
and the prosperity of its citizens is at risk. The danger presented by 
China’s Innovation Warfare tactics is also an existential one. 
A technological future dictated by Chinese interests is unlikely 
to incorporate western values of privacy and personal liberties into 
that technology. Innovation Warfare thus constitutes a threat against 
which the United States must defend itself. Development and 
execution of an Innovation Warfare counterstrategy are therefore 
critical to protecting the national security and economic interests of 
the United States and negating the type of economic and geopolitical 
aggression that previously led to two World Wars. Executing a 
counterstrategy not only preserves the peace but ensures that peace 
is one in which American welfare and liberties remain intact. There 
are four things the United States must do to execute an effective 
counterstrategy. These four things are: 
1) Future-Oriented Technology Intelligence – Develop machine 
learning tools to identify the possible technological futures 
and drive towards the preferred future(s); 
2) Strategic Technology Development – Optimize and scope 
federal R&D spending to seed the innovations necessary to 
attain the preferred future(s); 
3) Secure Technology Control Positions – Identify and secure 
control positions along the preferred future technology 
implementation path, including deploying and protecting 
DEC. 2020] Innovation Warfare 257 
intellectual property as an armament in the Innovation 
Warfare battlespace; and 
4) Organize to Win – Develop the cross-functional capabilities 
and inter-organizational coordination both within the 
government and across the public-private interface. 
Innovation Warfare distilled down to its most basic truth is a 
footrace to control the technological future. FTA capabilities are 
thus vital not just to winning, but also to defining the mileposts along 
the racecourse. Future investments in FTA capabilities will be 
critical to overtake the lead others have built in this field. One cannot 
influence the attainment of a future one cannot see, or which others 
can see well in advance. In a world where others have advanced FTA 
capabilities, it will be difficult to optimize research into new 
technologies with equivalent speed and insightfulness absent those 
investments. 
The capabilities necessary to implement the remaining elements 
of the Innovation Warfare counterstrategy already exist but must be 
marshalled and aligned with strategic goals. In particular, the 
government, and specifically the Department of Defense, should 
work to expand its intellectual property portfolios and align them 
with Innovation Warfare objectives. Intellectual property constitutes 
a crucial armament in the Innovation Warfare battlespace. 
Intellectual property establishes control positions along the 
racecourse to the technological future(s). According to the 
principles of strategic openness, these control positions can be gated 
open to encourage technology adoption, or gated closed to prevent 
it. Deft use of advanced licensing techniques employs these principles 
to manage the established control positions and ensures that the 
technological future arrived at is the one preferred. 
Each of these enumerated counterstrategy elements stands not 
alone but works in concert with the others. Leadership must 
organize nationally and at the agency levels to synchronize these 
efforts. Agencies with strong research portfolios, such as the 
Department of Defense and Department of Energy, will require a 
designated leader or function to coordinate the intellectual property 
and control position aspects of the counterstrategy across various 
internal stakeholders. This functionality can be achieved by 
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appointing a CIPO or by expanding the responsibilities of existing 
personnel. Within the Department of Defense, it may additionally be 
possible to designate one department, for example, the Navy, as the 
lead executive agency with overall responsibility for implementing the 
counterstrategy. Sufficient statutory authority exists to execute the 
Innovation Warfare counterstrategy and organizational design, without 
the need for additional legislation or rulemaking. 
Innovation Warfare may exist in the gray area between peace 
and war, but it nonetheless is a conflict the United States must win. 
